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Thispaper re-examines theGATT/WTOmembershipeffect onbilateral tradeﬂows,usingnonparametricmethods
including pair-matching, permutation tests, and a Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity analysis. Together, these
methods provide an estimation framework that is robust to misspeciﬁcation bias, allows general forms of
heterogeneous membership effects, and addresses potential hidden selection bias. This is in contrast to most
conventional parametric studies on this issue. Our results suggest large GATT/WTO trade-promoting effects that
are robust to various restricted matching criteria, alternative GATT/WTO indicators, non-random incidence of
positive trade ﬂows, inclusion of multilateral resistance terms, and different matching methodologies.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Since its creation in 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) has played an important role in the international
trading system. It has sponsored eight rounds of trade-policy
negotiations that successfully brought down the average tariff rates
on industrial goods and also expanded the set of substantive rules
governing international trade (beyond tariffs to nontariff barriers, and
beyond trade in merchandise to trade in services). This process
culminated in the establishment of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 1995. Since 1947, the GATT/WTO has also grown in its
membership from a small set of 23 (mainly developed) countries to a
roster that now includes more than 150 countries. Meanwhile, global
trade ﬂows have increased exponentially at a rate above the growth
rate of merchandise output. It is against this backdrop that the ﬁnding
by Rose (2004) came as a surprise.
Based on the gravity model of trade (that hypothesizes that the
bilateral trade volume between two countries varies positively
with their economic sizes and inversely with their bilateral trade
resistance), Rose (2004) conducted parametric estimations and found
that the GATT/WTO membership status of a country pair had no
statistically signiﬁcant effect on bilateral trade. This negative ﬁnding
was partially reversed by Tomz et al. (2007) when they reclassiﬁed
countries according to their participation status in the GATT/WTO
(instead of formalmembership), and by Subramanian andWei (2007)
when they differentiated the effects by subsets of the sample (e.g.,
developed versus developing countries). Although shedding light on
possible caveats to the original study by Rose (2004), these studies and
other follow-up research in this literature have largely followed the
conventional approach of parametric estimation. In this paper, we
argue that when the leading gravity theories do not have clear
guidance on the parametric (functional) relations of the empirical
trade-resistance measures, and when the economic theories of trade
agreements (e.g., Bagwell and Staiger, 2010, pp. 245–247) suggest that
heterogeneous membership effects on trade are important implica-
tions (of uneven levels of trade negotiation participation), these
existing parametric studies are at risk of misspeciﬁcation bias on both
accounts. We propose a system of nonparametric methods that is
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geared toward these concerns to re-evaluate the GATT/WTO trade
effect.
In particular, we apply pair-matching methods to obtain point
effect estimates. Following the established gravity theories (Anderson,
1979; Bergstrand, 1985; Deardorff, 1998; Anderson and vanWincoop,
2003), empirical researchers have come to adopt a long list of variables
as proxies for the theoretical concept of trade resistance between a pair
of countries. This list typically includes (foremost) distance, geo-
graphic characteristics, language, colonial ties, currency union, free
trade agreement, and the GATT/WTO membership status. However,
there is no clear theoretical justiﬁcation for the linear relation (among
the various trade-resistance measures) that is often adopted in the
empirical studies. In this paper, we conductmatching based on a set of
covariates that is exactly the same as the list of regressors used in
parametric studies. However, by matching observations that have
different treatment status but are otherwise similar in terms of these
covariates, we do not have to take a stand on the functional relations
among these observed covariates and hence avoid potential paramet-
ric misspeciﬁcations. In addition, the matching method by design
allows for the treatment (i.e., membership) effect to vary with the
observed covariates, and thus it can accommodate arbitrary forms of
heterogeneous treatment effects. In general, the homogeneous effect
estimate in regression approaches does not correspond to the average
of subject-wise heterogeneous effects, if the heterogeneity takes on
highly nonlinear functional forms.
We also address other potential econometric concerns arising in
the current application. First, given a panel of bilateral trade data,
which likely have a complicated data structure with serial and spatial
dependence, this paper applies permutation tests that circumvent the
difﬁculty in deriving asymptotic tests. Permutation tests are nonpara-
metric and exact inferences (applicable to ﬁnite sample sizes). They
are also straightforward to implement in thematching framework.We
generalize the test to explicitly allow for heterogeneous treatment
effects in constructing the conﬁdence intervals. Finally, we complete
the estimationprocedurewith anonparametric sensitivity analysis à la
Rosenbaum (2002) to formally address potential bias due to
unobserved self-selection into membership. We put together the
above methods in a coherent manner such that they can be easily
applied to other treatment effect problems of a similar nature.
Applying the nonparametric methods to the data set of Rose
(2004), we reach a conclusion that is in stark contrast with Rose
(2004):membership in the GATT/WTOhas large and signiﬁcant trade-
promoting effects. We explore robustness of this result to various
possible caveats; the general ﬁnding continues to hold. First, both
parametric gravity andnonparametricmatching estimators rely on the
assumption of ‘selection on observables’; in other words, non-random
selection into membership based on unobservables is assumed away.
This assumption may fail if there are important omitted variables. The
Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity analysis partly addresses this problem.
Alternatively, we also conduct restricted matching, where we further
limit the match to observations from the same ‘dyad’ (where a dyad
indicates a pair of trading countries), the same year, or the same
relative development stage. This eliminates potential bias arising from
unobserved heterogeneity across dyads, years, or development stages.
Second, Tomz et al. (2007) emphasize the importance of de facto
participation in the GATT/WTO by colonies, newly independent
nations and provisional members, and ﬁnd strong GATT/WTO effects
on trade when this type of nonmember participation is taken into
account. We conduct the same nonparametric analysis using the data
set of Tomz et al. (2007) and ﬁnd even stronger results than those
based on the Rose (2004) data set.
Third, we verify the robustness of pair-matching by conducting
‘kernel-weighting matching’, which allows multiple matches for a
subject while assigning greater weights to closer matches. The kernel-
weightingmatching effect estimates are very similar to pair-matching
estimates.
Fourth, by using the data set of Rose (2004) or Tomz et al. (2007),
we have based our analysis on observations with positive trade ﬂows.
Studies by Helpman et al. (2008) and Felbermayr and Kohler (2007)
suggest that the incidence of positive trade ﬂows may not be random.
To address possible bias due to non-random incidence of active trading
relationships, we apply our nonparametric procedures to the subset of
the data where a dyad has reported bilateral trade ﬂows before either
country in the dyad ever joins the GATT/WTO. For these observations,
the membership effect on prompting new trading relationships is not
relevant, and hence the effect estimates correspond to only the
membership effect on trade volumes. We ﬁnd overall stronger effect
estimates based on this reﬁned analysis.
Fifth, relative, rather than absolute, trade resistance is argued by
some gravity theories to be more appropriate in explaining bilateral
trade ﬂows (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003); thus, multilateral
resistance terms may have to be controlled for. We follow recent
studies by Baier and Bergstrand (2009a,b) to approximate the en-
dogenous multilateral resistance terms by observable exogenous
trade resistance covariates in the matching framework. The strong
trade effects of GATT/WTO remain.
Finally, we explore an alternative treatment effect concept, differ-
ence-in-difference,which is based onweaker identiﬁcation assumptions
and thus could be more robust to potential bias due to selection on
unobservables. This method compares the difference over time in the
trade volume of a member dyad to that of a comparable nonmember
dyad. Thematching estimates indicate that the GATT/WTO trade effects
arenegligible in earlyphasesof themembership, but becomestatistically
and economically signiﬁcant ﬁve or six years after the GATT/WTO
accession. To complete the analysis, we conduct placebo exercises and
verify that the time trends of trade ﬂows of matched dyads are the same
in advance of membership, dismissing concerns that the difference-in-
difference estimates may be picking up systematic differences in time
trends between member and nonmember dyads due to unobservables
not controlled for.
The discrepancy between the ﬁnding of the current nonparametric
approach and that of the conventional parametric approach suggests
that parametric gravity models may be misspeciﬁed. We explore
generalizing the parametric gravity model's speciﬁcations to reduce
the discrepancy. Our limited search suggests that the assumption
of homogeneous membership effects could be a major source of
misspeciﬁcation. By allowing the membership dummies to interact
with observed covariates (and hence allowing themembership effects
to vary with dyad-year characteristics), we ﬁnd the parametric effect
estimates to become signiﬁcant and positive. However, more research
into the nature of heterogeneous membership effects seems desirable
and we leave this for future research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the nonparametric methodologies. Section 3 explains the data used.
Sections 4 and 5 present our benchmark estimation results and
robustness checks. Section 6 explores potential misspeciﬁcations of
the parametric gravity models. Section 7 provides our conclusions.
2. Methodology
2.1. Mean effects and matching
Recall that a ‘dyad’ indicates a pair of trading countries. In the
current application, an observation unit corresponds to a dyad i in a
year t, while a matched ‘pair’ indicates two observation units matched
on covariates. Let dit denote the observed treatment status of a dyad i
in year t, where dit=1 if the subject it is treated and 0 if untreated. The
treatment dummy dit takes on different meanings as the treatment
under study changes. For example, a dyad-year is ‘both-in’ treated if
both countries of the dyad in the year are GATT/WTO members and
untreated if both are nonmembers. Deﬁne yit1 (yit0) as the potential
treated (untreated) response; in our application, this corresponds to
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the potential treated (untreated) bilateral trade volume of the dyad-
year it. Thus, the observed response is yit≡dit yit1+(1−dit)yit0. Finally,
let xit denote the observed covariates for the dyad-year that could
potentially affect the selection into the treatment and the response to
the treatment. Label the group of treated and untreated observations
‘the treatment group’ and ‘the control group’, respectively. In the
following, we will often omit the subscript it to simplify presentation.
One can identify the mean effect E(y1−y0|x) conditional on x by
the conditional group mean difference:
E y jd = 1; xð Þ−E y jd = 0; xð Þ = E y1 jd = 1; x
 
−E y0 jd = 0; x
 
= E y1−y0 jx
 
if y0; y1
 
∐d jx;
where (y0, y1)∐d|x is the identifying ‘selection on observables’
assumption. It says that both the potential treated and untreated
responses (y0, y1) are independent ofd given x; that is, theonly sourceof
selection bias is via the observed covariates; the selection into treatment
is random once x is controlled for. This identifying condition is actually
equivalent to the condition inparametric regressionapproaches that the
treatmentdummybeuncorrelatedwith the error termof the regression.
A weaker identifying assumption y0∐d|x is sufﬁcient if one is only
interested in the ‘effect on the treated’, as under the assumption,
E y jd = 1; xð Þ−E y jd = 0; xð Þ = E y1 jd = 1; x
 
−E y0 jd = 0; x
 
= E y1 jd = 1; x
 
−E y0 jd = 1; x
 
= E y1−y0 jd = 1; x
 
:
Alternatively, the assumption y1∐d|x is sufﬁcient to identify the
‘effect on the untreated’ E(y1−y0|d=0, x). Once the x-conditional effect
is found, x can be integrated out to yield a marginal effect. For example,
for the effect on the treated, the distribution F(x|d=1) of x|d=1 can be
used to obtain the mean effect:
E y1−y0 jd = 1
 
= ∫E y1−y0 jd = 1; x
 
dF x jd = 1ð Þ:
This framework of ﬁrst ﬁnding the x-conditional effect has two
obvious advantages: ﬁrst, by conditioning on x, we do not need to
model the structural relationship among x and avoid the misspeciﬁca-
tion bias that may arise in the parametric approach; second, this
allows for trade effects to vary with dyad-year characteristics x in
arbitrary ways. The unconditional mean effect then reﬂects the
average of the heterogeneous x-conditional treatment effects weight-
ed by the frequency of x. It is this average effect (on all, on the treated,
or on the untreated) that we estimate. This departs from the para-
metric gravity regression approach, where a homogeneous treatment
effect regardless of x is typically assumed. Apparently, by conditioning
on x, self-selection into treatment based on the observed covariates is
controlled for in the matching framework.
The pair-matching estimator for the effect on the treated can be
obtained as follows. First, consider a treated subject, say subject it.
Second, select the control subject that is the closest to the treated
subject it in terms of x.2 Third, supposeMmatched pairs are obtained,
and ym1 and ym2 are the trade volumes of the two subjects in pair m
ordered such that ym1Nym2 without loss of generality. Then, deﬁning
sm=1 if the ﬁrst subject in pair m is treated and −1 otherwise, the
effect on the treated can be estimated with
D≡ 1
M
∑
M
m=1
sm ym1−ym2ð Þ→p E y1−y0 jd = 1
 
under y0 ∐ d jx; ð1Þ
which is simply the average of the pair-wise differences in trade
volumes of treated and untreated subjects in matched pairs.
Some remarks are in order. First, for a treated subject, if there is no
good matching control, the subject may be passed over; i.e., a ‘caliper’
c may be set such that a treated subject it with mini′t′∈C ‖xit−xi′t′‖Nc
is discarded, where ‘i′t′∈C’ indicates subjects in the control group.
Second, the above matching scheme can be reversed to result in an
estimator for the effect on the untreated: consider the control group,
and for each control subject, select the best matching subject from the
treatment group. Finally, one can estimate the effect on all by
including, in the estimator D, all (treated and control) subjects that
have a qualiﬁed match.
Matching is widely used in labor and health economics. See, for
example, Heckman et al. (1997) and Imbens (2004), and applications
in Heckman et al. (1998), Lechner (2000), and Lu et al. (2001).
Matching methods have also started to appear in international
economics studies such as Persson (2001) on the currency union
effect and Baier and Bergstrand (2009b) on the free trade agreement
effect. See Rosenbaum (2002) and Lee (2005) for more discussions on
treatment effects and matching in general.
2.2. Permutation test for matched pairs
Although matching estimators are popular in practice, their
asymptotic properties are not fully understood.3 In practice, a
standard t-statistic or a bootstrap procedure is often used to derive
the p-value or the conﬁdence interval (CI). The standard t-statistic is
straightforward but theoretical justiﬁcations are not available in most
cases; on the other hand, the bootstrap is computationally demanding
and argued to be invalid by Abadie and Imbens (2006). In this paper,
we propose using permutation tests.
Permutation tests invoke the concept of exchangeability, which
suggests that under the null hypothesis H0 of no effect, potential
treated and untreated responses are exchangeable without affecting
their joint distribution: F(yit0, yit1|x)=F(yit1, yit0|x). This implies that
under the null, the two potential responses have the same marginal
distribution and hence the same mean given x. Thus, we can test the
equal mean (i.e., zero mean effect) implication of the null.
It is straightforward to carry out the permutation test described
above for matched pairs and test for a zero mean effect under the null.
Under the null hypothesis of exchangeability, the two subjects in each
matched pair are exchangeable in the labeling of their treatment status
(treated or untreated). In each permutation of ‘pseudo’ treatment
assignment, one can calculate the ‘pseudo’ effect estimate. By obtaining
all possible 2M permutations of the treatment labels in all M pairs, one
can calculate the exact p-value of the observed mean effect estimate D
byplacing it in the ‘empirical’distributionof thepseudo effect estimates.
WhenM is large (as in the current application), such that thenumber
of permutations is huge, one can approximate the exact p-value by
simulating only a subset (say, 1000) of permutation possibilities from
the complete permutation space and comparing the observed effect
estimate D against the simulated sample of pseudo effect estimates.
Alternatively, one can apply normal approximation. Note that in a
permutation, the obtained pseudo effect estimator can be written as
D′≡ 1M∑Mm=1wmsm ym1−ym2ð Þ, where wm, m=1, …, M, is a iid random
variable such that P(wm=1)=P(wm=−1)=0.5. That is, the treat-
ment labels of the two responses in pair m are exchanged if wm=−1,
2 We use the simple scale-normalized distance measure, (xit−xi′t′)Σx−1(xit−xi′t′)′,
where i′t′ refers to a control subject and Σx is a diagonal matrix containing the sample
variances of the covariates in the pooled sample on the diagonal. As x in our data
includes continuous variables (cf. Section 3), the likelihood of multiple-matching
(multiple control subjects with the same distance to the treated subject) is negligible;
thus, we restrict our attention to pair-matching (where each subject has a unique
closest match).
3 See, however, exceptions such as Abadie and Imbens (2006) for the case of iid
data.
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and no exchange otherwise. We show in the appendix that, conditional
on the observed data, the exact p-value of D can be approximated by
P D′ ≥D
 
≃ P N 0;1ð Þ≥ D
∑Mm=1 ym1−ym2ð Þ2 =M2
 1=2
( )
; ð2Þ
which turns out to use the same t-statistic as the conventional two-
sample test. Thus, this display incidentally provides a theoretical
justiﬁcation for the common practice of using the t-statistic to eval-
uate the signiﬁcance of matching estimators, although we have
derived (2) from an exact inferential approach (i.e., permutation with
respect to the treatment labels but conditional on the observed data)
and not based on asymptotic distribution theories (i.e., sampling with
respect to the data).
In addition to testing the null hypothesis of a zero mean effect, one
may also be interested in an interval estimate of the mean effect. We
show in the appendix how to obtain the CI for the mean effect by
‘inverting’ the above test (e.g., Lehmann and Romano, 2005). It is
worth noting that in deriving the CI, we have generalized the inverting
procedure to explicitly allow for heterogeneous treatment effects.
As indicated above, permutation inference methods have several
advantages: (i) they are nonparametric as they do not require dis-
tributional assumptions on the response, other than the exchange-
ability condition, and (ii) they are exact inferences despite making no
parametric distributional assumptions in small samples, and they are
often equivalent to conventional asymptotic inference methods in
large samples when normal approximation is used. On the other hand,
as permutation tests invoke a stronger concept of no effect (on the
distribution), this rules out testing for null hypotheses of no effect (on
the mean) that still allow some effects on other moments of the
distribution. In small samples where normal approximation does not
apply, permutation tests may also be computer-intensive. Both
disadvantages, however, are not important in the current application.
Permutation tests, instead of asymptotic tests, are especially con-
venient in the current application with a panel of bilateral trade data,
which possibly have a complicated data structurewith serial and spatial
dependence, rendering the derivation of asymptotic properties for the
matching estimator difﬁcult if not impossible. By relying on exchange-
ability as the null hypothesis of no effect, the permutation test can
accommodate potentially a wide range of data structures. For example,
suppose that the joint distribution F(yit0, yit1|x) is normal. In this scenario,
the exchangeability condition requires only that the treated and
untreated responses have the same mean and variance conditional on
x. This allows for heteroskedasticity (i.e., variances of responses to vary
with x) or correlation across time or observation units.
Permutation tests have a longhistory in statistics since Fisher (1935)
and are widely used in statistics and medicine. Recently, Imbens and
Rosenbaum (2005) applied permutation inference to well-known
“weak instrument” data in economics to ﬁnd that only permutation
methods provided reliable inference. Ho and Imai (2006) also applied
permutation inference to a political science data set. As can be seen in
these examples, the application of permutationmethods is fairly new in
the social sciences. Formore on permutation (or randomization) tests in
general, see Hollander andWolfe (1999), Pesarin (2001), Ernst (2004),
and Lehmann and Romano (2005), among others.
2.3. Signed-rank test for matched pairs
Instead of the difference in response sm(ym1−ym2),we can apply the
permutation inference to the ‘signed rank’ of the difference in response.
The advantage is that rank-based tests are more robust to outliers. In
addition, the ensuing Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity analysis can be
applied to the signed-rank test easily. The disadvantage on the other
hand is that such rank-based tests are geared more to testing for no
effect rather than to estimating the effect itself, which results in a
roundabout way of getting the point estimate and CI (as shown in the
appendix). Since these effect estimates can only be derived under the
assumption of homogeneous treatment effects, in contrastwith those in
Sections 2.1 and 2.2, they are of less interest to the current application.
However, the signiﬁcance level (i.e., the p-value) of the signed-rank test
remains valid against an alternative of either homogeneous or het-
erogeneous treatment effects (and so does the Rosenbaum's sensitivity
analysis that follows).
Applying the Wilcoxon (1945) signed-rank test to the current
context, rank |ym1−ym2|,m=1,…,M, and denote the resulting ranks
as r1, …, rM, where a larger rank rm corresponds to a larger absolute
difference in response. The signed-rank statistic is then the sum of the
ranks of the pairs where the treated subject has the higher response:
R ≡ ∑
M
m=1
rm1 sm = 1½ :
The p-value of the R-statistic can be obtained by the pseudo-
sample simulation procedure or the normal approximation method as
discussed in Section 2.2. In particular, we show in the appendix that
when M is large, the normally approximated p-value for R under the
null hypothesis of exchangeability is
P R′ ≥ R
 
≃ P N 0;1ð Þ≥ R−E R′ð Þ
V R′ð Þ1=2
( )
; ð3Þ
where R′ is the permuted version of R, E(R′)=M(M+1)/4, and V(R′)=
M(M+1)(2M+1)/24.
2.4. Sensitivity analysis with signed-rank test
As noted in Section 2.1, the key identifying assumption for the
matching estimator is the ‘selection on observables’ condition. The
same condition is also required for parametric regression approaches.
This condition may fail if there are omitted third variables or
unobservables that affect both the treatment d (the decision to join
the GATT/WTO) and the response y (the trade ﬂows). In a parametric
framework, one may deal with this problem of ‘selection on
unobservables’ using techniques such as Heckman's (1979). In the
current nonparametric framework, the Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity
analysis provides a convenient way to account for selection on
unobservables.
The analysis is structured as follows. Suppose that the treatment d
is affected by an unobserved confounder ε. Then, two subjects in a
matched pair with the same x but possibly different ε may have
different probabilities of taking the treatment. Let the odds ratio of
taking the treatment across all matched pairs be bounded between 1/Γ
and Γ for some constant Γ≥1. For instance, if the ﬁrst subject's prob-
ability of taking the treatment is 0.6 and the second subject's 0.5, the
odds ratio is (0.6/0.4)/(0.5/0.5)=1.5.
Rosenbaum (2002) shows that given the bounds on the odds ratio,
one can derive the corresponding bounds on the signiﬁcance level of
many rank-sum statistics under the null hypothesis of no effect. This
places bounds on the signiﬁcance level thatwould have been appropriate
had ε been observed. The sensitivity analysis for a signiﬁcance level starts
with the scenario of no hidden bias (Γ=1). The sensitivity parameter Γ is
then increased from 1 to see how the initial conclusion is affected. If it
takes a large value of Γ (i.e., a large deviation from 1 in the odds ratio) to
eliminate an original ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant effect or to overturn an
original ﬁnding of no effect, the initial conclusion is deemed robust to
unobserved confounders; otherwise, the initial ﬁnding is sensitive.
We show in the appendix how to apply the Rosenbaum (2002)
sensitivity analysis to the signed-rank statistic and derive the bounds on
the signiﬁcance level (the p-value) of the observed statistic R under the
null of no effect. In particular, for a given degree Γ ≥ 1 of departure from
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the state of no hidden bias, deﬁne pþ≡ Γ1 + Γ ≥ 0:5 and p−≡ 11 + Γ ≤ 0:5.
The p-value of the observed statistic R is bounded as follows:
PðRþ ≥ RÞ≥ P R′ ≥ R ≥ P R− ≥ Rð Þ; ð4Þ
where R+≡∑m=1M rmumwith P(um=1)=p+ and P(um=0)=1−p+,
and likewise for R−. Note that the means and variances of R+ and R−
include E(R′) and V(R′) as a special casewhen p+=p−=1/2 under no
hidden bias.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that the H0-rejection interval is in the upper
tail, and the p-value assuming no hidden bias is P(R′≥R)=0.001,
leading to the rejection of H0 at level αN0.001. By allowing an unob-
served confounder to cause the odds ratio to deviate from 1 and up to
(1/Γ, Γ), the correct tail probability is unknown but is bounded above
by P Rþ≥Rð Þ≃P N 0;1ð Þ≥ R−E Rþð ÞSD Rþð Þ
n o
. The upper bound can be obtained
for different values of Γ to ﬁnd the critical value Γ* at which the upper
bound crosses the critical level α.
The relevant distribution (R+ or R−) to use for the sensitivity
analysis corresponds to the direction of hidden bias that would
undermine an initial ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant treatment effect or reverse
an initial ﬁnding of no effect. Loosely speaking, for example, if the
ﬁnding is a signiﬁcantly positive effect, we only need to worry about
‘positive’ selection, where a subject with a higher potential treatment
effect is alsomore likely to be treated; thus, the relevant distribution is
R+ that embodies selection bias in this direction. On the other hand, if
the ﬁnding is a signiﬁcantly negative effect, then ‘negative’ selection,
where a subject with a lower potential treatment effect is also more
likely to be treated, can reverse or weaken the original ﬁnding; in this
case, the sensitivity analysis with R− is applicable.
As reviewed in the appendix, there exist alternative approaches of
sensitivity analysis, but they are typically parametric in nature or not
applicable to cases with continuous response variables. In compari-
son, the Rosenbaum (2002) approach imposes relatively mild as-
sumptions (that the odds ratio of subjects matched on x be bounded
between 1/Γ and Γ) and is straightforward to apply. While most other
approaches specify how the unobserved confounder affects both the
treatment and response, the Rosenbaum (2002) approach focuses
only on how the unobservable may affect the treatment. Thus, the
Rosenbaum (2002) approach is likely to be more robust to parametric
misspeciﬁcations (and at the same time, conservative). On the other
hand, by leaving the relationship between the unobserved confounder
and the response unspeciﬁed, this approach cannot in general con-
struct bias-adjusted effect estimates as in parametric approaches (of
the sensitivity analysis nature or of the Heckman type). Instead, this
approach evaluates how robust the effect estimate obtained under the
assumption of no hidden bias is to the unobserved selection problem.
This sensitivity analysis ultimately relies on the researcher's judgment
of whether Γ * at which the initial signiﬁcance ﬁnding reverses is
considered large enough. In general, the more important covariates
are included in x and the less likely for the odds ratio to be affected by
unobserved confounders, the smaller a value for Γ can be tolerated.
Roughly speaking, we will adopt a threshold of 1.5, which is often
adopted by studies using similar sensitivity analysis.4
3. Data description
We base our analysis on the Rose (2004) data set,5 although we
will also use the Tomz et al. (2007) data set in Section 5.2 as one of the
robustness checks. Readers are referred to the source for a detailed
account of the data. The data set includes 234,597 observations on
trade ﬂows among 178 IMF trading entities between 1948 and 1999
(with some “gaps” and missing observations). There are 12,150
distinct dyads and, on average, about 19 observations for each dyad.
The list of variables and their deﬁnitions are given in Table 1.
The set of covariates we use for matching are exactly the same as
the set of regressors used by Rose (2004) and most other studies in
the literature that follow parametric approaches. Thus, we can attri-
bute differences in our ﬁndings mainly to the different methodologies
taken. In parallel with the previous studies, we will study the effect
of GATT/WTO membership, as well as the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP), on a dyad's bilateral trade volume. In particular,
two kinds of membership effects are considered: when both countries
in a dyad are GATT/WTO members relative to when both are not
(both-in effect), and when only one country in a dyad is a GATT/WTO
member relative to when both are not (one-in effect). The GSP (which
are trade preferences extended from the rich to the poor countries)
was found by Rose (2004) to have strong trade effects. We include it
Table 1
Variables and deﬁnitions.
Variable Deﬁnition
Response variable
ltrade The log average value of a dyad's current real bilateral trade ﬂows
Covariates
ldist The log distance between the two countries in a dyad
lrgdp The log product of a dyad's real GDPs
lrgdppc The log product of a dyad's real GDPs per capita
comlang =1 if the two countries in a dyad share a common language (=0 otherwise)
border =1 if the two countries in a dyad share a land border (=0 otherwise)
landl = the number of landlocked countries in a dyad
island = the number of island nations in a dyad
lareap The log product of a dyad's land areas
comcol =1 if the two countries in a dyad were ever colonies after 1945 with the same colonizer (=0 otherwise)
curcol =1 if the two countries in a dyad are in a colonial relationship (=0 otherwise)
colony =1 if the two countries in a dyad were ever in a colonial relationship (=0 otherwise)
comctry =1 if the two countries in a dyad remained part of the same nation during the sample period (=0 otherwise)
custrict =1 if the two countries in a dyad use the same currency (=0 otherwise)
regional =1 if the two countries in a dyad belong to the same regional trade agreement (=0 otherwise)
year dummy For t=1948, …, 1999.
Treatment variables (the variable becomes part of the covariates if not used as a treatment variable)
bothin =1 if both countries in a dyad are GATT/WTO members (=0 otherwise)
onein =1 if only one country in a dyad is a GATT/WTO member (=0 otherwise)
gsp =1 if the two countries in a dyad have a GSP arrangement (=0 otherwise)
4 See Aakvik (2001), Hujer et al. (2004), Caliendo et al. (2005), Hujer and Thomsen
(2006), and Lee and Lee (2009), for example.
5 Available at faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/GATTdataStata.zip.
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in our study to demonstrate that our nonparametric approach can
deliver similar effect estimates as the parametric approach in the case
of GSP; this provides an anchor to evaluate the drastically different
results for both-in and one-in effects.
Table 2 gives the summary statistics of the covariates across three
groups of observations by the joint membership status of a dyad (both
in, one in, or none in). The control (none-in) dyads on average tend to be
closer in distance and smaller in economic sizes, are poorer, and appear
in earlier years. Alternatively, based on simple logistic regressions,
Table 3 shows thatmost of the observable covariates affect the selection
into membership, and their selection effects (in terms of odds) are
statistically signiﬁcant (different from one). For example, dyads that are
farther apart fromeachother, or larger ineconomic sizes, aremore likely
to be GATT/WTO members.
A typical concern about using the matching methods is the extent
of overlapping support of the distribution of observable covariates
between the treatment and control groups. Fig. 1 provides one such
visual check often used in thematching literature, where, based on the
same logistic regression as above, the propensity score of an ob-
servation taking the treatment is estimated and the score's frequencies
are tabulated across the treatment and control groups. The histograms
in Fig. 1 suggest that the supports of the propensity score overlap fairly
well between the both-in treated and control groups, or between the
one-in treated and control groups.
4. Benchmark results
4.1. Both-in effects
Table 4 reports the estimation results aswe apply thenonparametric
methodologies described in Section 2 to the data set of Rose (2004). The
both-in effects are signiﬁcantly positive regardless of the caliper choice
(which sets the best 100%, 80%, 60%, or 40% of matched pairs to include
in the estimation). The estimates suggest thatmembership in the GATT/
WTO by both countries on average raises bilateral trade volume by 74%
(=e0.553−1) to 277% (=e1.328−1) for dyads that both chose to be in
the GATT/WTO. In contrast, bilateral trade volumes would have
increased by 20% (=e0.185−1) to 40% (=e0.337−1) if the nonmember
dyads had both joined the GATT/WTO. The both-in effect on all is
positive and signiﬁcant, reﬂecting in large part the effect on the treated.
The signiﬁcant difference between the both-in effect on the treated
and untreated suggests the presence of heterogeneous treatment
effects. To see this, note that if the treatment effect is homogeneous
regardless of x, thenwe do not need to worry about the separate effect
Table 2
Rose (2004) data set – descriptive statistics.
Variables Both in One in None in (control group)
Mean SD 25% 75% Mean SD 25% 75% Mean SD 25% 75%
ltrade 10.472 3.415 8.344 12.815 9.759 3.253 8.013 11.937 9.246 2.964 8.062 11.124
ldist 8.198 0.797 7.843 8.745 8.188 0.772 7.751 8.749 7.873 0.972 7.216 8.685
lrgdp 48.404 2.681 46.615 50.218 47.582 2.526 45.930 49.265 46.432 2.582 44.968 48.068
lrgdppc 16.234 1.579 15.242 17.358 15.940 1.394 15.036 16.902 15.386 1.344 14.508 16.249
comlang 0.238 0.426 0 0 0.187 0.390 0 0 0.304 0.460 0 1
border 0.027 0.162 0 0 0.026 0.160 0 0 0.072 0.258 0 0
landl 0.251 0.471 0 0 0.241 0.461 0 0 0.246 0.467 0 0
island 0.364 0.548 0 1 0.331 0.535 0 1 0.264 0.503 0 0
lareap 24.145 3.230 22.445 26.314 24.270 3.293 22.466 26.588 24.238 3.480 22.362 26.739
comcol 0.105 0.307 0 0 0.089 0.285 0 0 0.124 0.330 0 0
curcol 0.004 0.062 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.017 0 0
colony 0.027 0.162 0 0 0.016 0.126 0 0 0.008 0.092 0 0
comctry 0.001 0.024 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
custrict 0.019 0.136 0 0 0.009 0.093 0 0 0.014 0.117 0 0
regional 0.018 0.134 0 0 0.009 0.096 0 0 0.019 0.138 0 0
gsp 0.299 0.458 0 1 0.201 0.400 0 0 0.008 0.090 0 0
year 1984.1 11.5 1976 1994 1978.9 12.4 1970 1989 1973.6 12.7 1963 1983
Obs. 114,750 98,810 21,037
Table 3
Rose (2004) data set – selection on observables.
Variables Both in One in
Odds p-value 95% CI Odds p-value 95% CI
ldist 1.174 0.000 1.147 1.202 1.230 0.000 1.203 1.257
lrgdp 1.538 0.000 1.521 1.555 1.222 0.000 1.209 1.235
lrgdppc 0.892 0.000 0.878 0.906 0.999 0.907 0.984 1.014
comlang 0.767 0.000 0.735 0.801 0.714 0.000 0.686 0.743
border 0.870 0.002 0.795 0.951 0.848 0.000 0.783 0.918
landl 1.187 0.000 1.142 1.233 1.072 0.000 1.034 1.112
island 1.872 0.000 1.793 1.955 1.448 0.000 1.391 1.508
lareap 0.875 0.000 0.867 0.882 0.947 0.000 0.940 0.955
comcol 1.645 0.000 1.546 1.750 1.293 0.000 1.223 1.368
curcol 12.385 0.000 5.320 28.834 1.678 0.000 1.417 1.988
colony 2.126 0.000 1.775 2.547 – – – –
comctry – – – – – – – –
custrict 6.961 0.000 6.031 8.034 1.705 0.000 1.467 1.981
regional 0.762 0.000 0.666 0.873 0.879 0.070 0.764 1.011
gsp 27.698 0.000 23.750 32.303 19.230 0.000 16.487 22.428
Obs. 135,720 119,841
Note: The results are based on logistic regressions with nonein=1 observations as the control group. The odds estimates are equal to exponential transformation of coefﬁcient
estimates in logit regressions. All regressions include year dummies. In the both-in regression, comctry is dropped as comctry=1 predicts bothin=1 perfectly. In the one-in
regression, curcol is dropped as curcol=1 predicts onein=0 perfectly and comctry is dropped because of collinearity.
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on the treated and untreated, as they should be the same. However, if
the effects are heterogeneous and vary with x, and if the selection into
the treatment also depends on x (as the previous section showed) such
that x is on average different between the treatment and control
groups, then the effect on the treated and untreated will be different.
The ﬁndings are very similar when the estimation is based on the
signed-rank test (the R-statistic) instead of the original permutation
test (the D-statistic). This remains the case throughout our analysis.
Thus, we will focus on the effect estimates based on the D-statistic
that theoretically allows for heterogeneous effects. Nonetheless, the
p-value of the signed-rank test will be focal, because it is the basis for
the Rosenbaum (2002) sensitivity analysis.
Results of the sensitivity analysis indicate that the positive both-in
effect on the treated is robust to selection bias to the extent that a
treated subject is not 2.081 times (and beyond) more likely than a
comparable untreated subject to take the treatment (by the80% caliper
and the two-sided test). The robustness ranges from 1.467 to 2.434 as
the test or the caliper choice varies. By the threshold of 1.5, the above
ﬁnding is reasonably robust. In comparison, the both-in effect on the
untreated is less robust to potential hidden bias. Overall, we see strong
evidence for a positive realized both-in effect on member dyads (and
less so for a positive potential effect on nonmember dyads).
On theoretical grounds, several economicmodels predict a positive
both-in effect on trade. Among others, the terms-of-trade argument
(Johnson, 1953–1954; Bagwell and Staiger, 1999, 2001) suggests that
multilateral trade agreements help coordinate countries' trade policies
and remove their terms-of-trade incentives to raise trade barriers. The
terms-of-trade incentive is shown by Broda et al. (2008) to be an
important factor indeed in non-WTO countries' trade policy. The
political-commitment argument (Staiger and Tabellini, 1987, 1989,
1999), on the other hand, suggests that multilateral trade agreements
help national governments commit themselves to liberalized trade
policies, bringing about efﬁcient production and trade structures.
In spite of the above theories, there are several empirical difﬁculties
in using membership to measure the GATT/WTO effect, as noted by
many in the literature, cf. Rose (2010). First, tariff reductions and
policy liberalizations do not necessarily coincide with the date of
accession. Second, some GATT/WTOmembers may extend their most-
favored-nation (MFN) treatment to nonmember trading partners.
Third, some countries (particularly developing countries) did not
liberalize their trade policies in spite of their membership in the GATT
(although this is less the case under the WTO). Fourth, some sectors
(e.g., oils and minerals) face little protectionism with or without the
GATT/WTO, while some (e.g., agriculture) are highly protectedwith or
without the GATT/WTO. The ﬁrst two considerations imply that
membership is a noisy measure (as a result, the estimates will be
downward biased), while the last two imply that GATT/WTO effect is
heterogeneous with no effect in some cases. The fact that we obtained
positive signiﬁcant effects implies that on average acrossmany trading
relationships, the theoretical both-in effect is strong enough to
dominate the above factors and to leave an empirically measurable
impact.
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Fig. 1. Support of covariates for the treatment and control groups.
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4.2. One-in and GSP effects
Unlike the both-in effect where onemay expect a positive effect, or
a zero effect at worst, a priori, the one-in effect can take either sign. On
one hand, import diversion by the new member from its nonmember
trading partner to other member trading partners may lower the
dyad's bilateral trade volumes. On the other hand, in many cases,
when a country joins the GATT/WTO, its tariff reductions (and other
policy liberalizations) offered to members on a MFN basis are also
extended to nonmember trading partners. In this case, imports
increase from all sources, including nonmember trading partners.
Furthermore, when a country gains access to the markets of existing
GATT/WTO members with the newly acquired membership, it may
increase imports of inputs necessary for the production of exports to
these destinations. Some of these additional imports may fall on third
nonmember countries. For example, with the accession into WTO,
China may increase imports of oil from Iran in its expansion of
production and export activities.
The results in Table 4 suggest that the one-in effect on the treated
is overall positive and signiﬁcant: the estimates range from 39%
(=e0.326−1) to 115% (=e0.767−1). Thus, it appears that the trade-
creating effects dominate the potential trade-diverting effects, for
dyads where one country has unilaterally joined the GATT/WTO.
Similar to the both-in effect, the one-in effect on the untreated is
smaller and less robust to potential hidden bias. Although there are
exceptions in our following analysis, overall, the evidence for a positive
GATT/WTO effect on the untreated is not strong (we may say that
countries have selected well in the sense that they only joined the
GATT/WTO if the perceived beneﬁts were large). Thus, we will report
only the effect on the treated in what follows. An extended set of
estimates are available in an unabridged version (Chang and Lee,
2010) of this paper.
Table 4
Rose (2004) data set – unrestricted matching.
Caliper Permutation test Signed-rank test Sensitivity analysis
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) One-sided test Two-sided test
Effect p-value 95% CI Effect p-value 95% CI Γ⁎ As in Γ⁎ As in
Both in GATT/WTO treatment effect
On the treated (M1=114, 750)
100% 1.328 0.000 [1.307, 1.349] 1.332 0.000 [1.312, 1.351] 2.434 R+ 2.428 R+
80% 1.075 0.000 [1.052, 1.098] 1.075 0.000 [1.053, 1.096] 2.086 R+ 2.081 R+
60% 0.836 0.000 [0.810, 0.862] 0.835 0.000 [0.810, 0.859] 1.780 R+ 1.775 R+
40% 0.553 0.000 [0.522, 0.584] 0.535 0.000 [0.507, 0.563] 1.472 R+ 1.467 R+
On the untreated (M0=21, 037)
100% 0.337 0.000 [0.296, 0.379] 0.303 0.000 [0.266, 0.342] 1.250 R+ 1.243 R+
80% 0.239 0.000 [0.192, 0.286] 0.200 0.000 [0.157, 0.241] 1.144 R+ 1.138 R+
60% 0.185 0.000 [0.131, 0.239] 0.138 0.000 [0.090, 0.187] 1.084 R+ 1.077 R+
40% 0.304 0.000 [0.239, 0.368] 0.243 0.000 [0.184, 0.301] 1.177 R+ 1.167 R+
On all (M1+M0=135, 787)
100% 1.175 0.000 [1.156, 1.193] 1.161 0.000 [1.143, 1.179] 2.209 R+ 2.205 R+
80% 0.899 0.000 [0.878, 0.919] 0.883 0.000 [0.863, 0.902] 1.858 R+ 1.854 R+
60% 0.636 0.000 [0.613, 0.659] 0.619 0.000 [0.597, 0.640] 1.559 R+ 1.555 R+
40% 0.428 0.000 [0.400, 0.455] 0.399 0.000 [0.374, 0.424] 1.342 R+ 1.338 R+
One in GATT/WTO treatment effect
On the treated (M1=98, 810)
100% 0.767 0.000 [0.746, 0.789] 0.773 0.000 [0.753, 0.792] 1.759 R+ 1.755 R+
80% 0.564 0.000 [0.540, 0.588] 0.568 0.000 [0.547, 0.589] 1.525 R+ 1.521 R+
60% 0.422 0.000 [0.396, 0.449] 0.428 0.000 [0.405, 0.451] 1.397 R+ 1.393 R+
40% 0.326 0.000 [0.296, 0.357] 0.325 0.000 [0.298, 0.351] 1.294 R+ 1.289 R+
On the untreated (M0=21, 037)
100% 0.030 0.068 [−0.009, 0.069] 0.034 0.022 [0.000, 0.068] 1.006 R+ 1.001 R+
80% 0.092 0.000 [0.048, 0.135] 0.089 0.000 [0.052, 0.126] 1.057 R+ 1.051 R+
60% 0.078 0.001 [0.028, 0.129] 0.084 0.000 [0.041, 0.127] 1.046 R+ 1.039 R+
40% 0.138 0.000 [0.076, 0.201] 0.149 0.000 [0.096, 0.203] 1.102 R+ 1.094 R+
On all (M1+M0=119, 847)
100% 0.638 0.000 [0.619, 0.657] 0.632 0.000 [0.615, 0.649] 1.610 R+ 1.607 R+
80% 0.443 0.000 [0.422, 0.464] 0.437 0.000 [0.418, 0.455] 1.401 R+ 1.397 R+
60% 0.324 0.000 [0.301, 0.347] 0.321 0.000 [0.301, 0.340] 1.297 R+ 1.293 R+
40% 0.225 0.000 [0.198, 0.253] 0.220 0.000 [0.197, 0.243] 1.194 R+ 1.190 R+
GSP treatment effect
On the treated (M1=54, 285)
100% 0.851 0.000 [0.831, 0.871] 0.792 0.000 [0.774, 0.811] 2.277 R+ 2.269 R+
80% 0.757 0.000 [0.736, 0.778] 0.696 0.000 [0.676, 0.716] 2.125 R+ 2.117 R+
60% 0.693 0.000 [0.668, 0.717] 0.627 0.000 [0.604, 0.649] 1.998 R+ 1.990 R+
40% 0.665 0.000 [0.635, 0.696] 0.581 0.000 [0.553, 0.608] 1.879 R+ 1.869 R+
Note:
1. The pool of potential matches for an observation is restricted to observations with the opposite treatment status; no further restriction is imposed. The number ofmatched pairs for
the effect on the treated (untreated) is indicated by M1 (M0).
2. The caliper is set such that only the best 100%, 80%, 60%, or 40% of matched pairs obtained are included in the analysis. For example, with the caliper choice of 60%, the matched
pairs with the scale-normalized distance exceeding the upper 60th percentile of all matched pairs obtained are discarded.
3. In ‘permutation test’, the results are based on the D-statistic.
4. In ‘signed-rank test’, the results are based on the R-statistic.
5. We carried out both simulation and normal approximation approaches for calculating the p-values and the CI's, and found almost identical results (which is expected given that
the sample size is large). Thus, we report only the results based on normal approximation.
6. In ‘sensitivity analysis’, the sensitivity analysis is conducted for the signiﬁcance (p-value) of the signed-rank R-statistic based on the critical level α=0.05 in a one-sided or two-
sided test. R+ or R−(as a function of the odds ratio Γ) indicates the relevant distribution in calculating the critical bound Γ * at which the conclusion of the signed-rank test reverses.
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The GSP scheme is also found to promote bilateral trade, by a factor
of 94% (=e0.665−1) to 134% (=e0.851−1) [the upper bound estimate is
very close to Rose's (2004) benchmark estimate 136% (=e0.86−1)].6
The GSP effect estimates are smaller than the both-in effects, but larger
than the one-in effects in general. This ranking seems to make sense in
theory. As the GSP is a system of unilateral trade preferences extended
only from a high-income country to its poor trading partners, its likely
effect on bilateral trade volumes is a priori smaller than if both the rich
and the poor countries in a dyad lower their import restrictions against
each other, which happens presumably if both join the GATT/WTO. On
the other hand, any trade-promoting effect of the one-inmembership is,
as argued above, indirect and conditional on the spillover of the MFN
treatment and on the dyad's initial trade pattern, while the effect of GSP
is directly derived from a straightforward reduction of dyad-speciﬁc
trade resistance.
It may be helpful to point out that the positive and stronger trade
effect of both-in is shared by a larger number of bilateral trading
relationships (114, 750) than that of GSP (54, 285). Thus, either on the
average or in the aggregate, our estimation results suggest that the
realized trade-creating effect of GATT/WTOmembership is larger than
GSP.
5. Robustness checks
In this section, we conduct an extensive set of robustness checks by
considering various restricted matching criteria, alternative GATT/WTO
indicators, the non-randomness of zero trade ﬂows, the inclusion of
multilateral resistance terms, and different matching methodologies.
Overall, the benchmark ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant GATT/WTO effect on
trade is strengthened, not weakened, while the GSP effect is qualiﬁed.
5.1. Restricted matching
Although we did the Rosenbaum (2002) analysis to assess the
sensitivity of the benchmark results to whatever selection bias may
remain after controlling for x, the analysis itself does not remove the
bias. In the literature, three potential sources of bias seem to be ofmajor
concern. They are systematic unobservable heterogeneity across dyads,
years, and development stages that may inﬂuence bilateral trade
volumes as well as selection into GATT/WTO. In view of this, we restrict
the potential match for a subject to observations that have the opposite
treatment status (as in the benchmark case) and are furthermore from
the same dyad, the same year, or the same relative development
stage, alternately. By doing this, we control for the likely dyad, year, or
development-stage speciﬁc effect.7
Table 5 summarizes the restrictedmatching results (we repeat in the
ﬁrst sub-column the relevant information from the benchmark case for
ease of comparison). The estimates suggest that the positive both-in
effect continues to be economically and statistically signiﬁcant, and
larger than either the one-in or GSP effect.8 In contrast with the ‘within-
year’ estimates that measure cross-sectional (or ‘between’) variations,
the ‘within-dyad’ estimatesmeasure time-series (or ‘within’) variations.
Both ‘within’ and ‘between’ variations indicate that there are signiﬁcant
gains in trade volumes by joining the GATT/WTO.
Table 5
Rose (2004) data set – restricted matching effect estimates and sensitivity.
Caliper Unrestricted Within dyad Within year Within devel.
Effect Γ ⁎ Effect Γ⁎ Effect Γ⁎ Effect Γ ⁎
Both in GATT/WTO treatment effect
On the treated
M1 114,750 19,760 114,750 112,959
100% 1.328⁎⁎⁎ 2.428 0.941⁎⁎⁎ 3.170 1.329⁎⁎⁎ 2.427 1.124⁎⁎⁎ 2.019
80% 1.075⁎⁎⁎ 2.081 0.760⁎⁎⁎ 2.543 1.075⁎⁎⁎ 2.081 0.778⁎⁎⁎ 1.601
60% 0.836⁎⁎⁎ 1.775 0.833⁎⁎⁎ 2.771 0.836⁎⁎⁎ 1.775 0.541⁎⁎⁎ 1.385
40% 0.553⁎⁎⁎ 1.467 0.796⁎⁎⁎ 2.503 0.553⁎⁎⁎ 1.467 0.393⁎⁎⁎ 1.256
One in GATT/WTO treatment effect
On the treated
M1 98,810 23,463 98,810 98,363
100% 0.767⁎⁎⁎ 1.755 0.464⁎⁎⁎ 1.931 0.761⁎⁎⁎ 1.747 0.650⁎⁎⁎ 1.552
80% 0.564⁎⁎⁎ 1.521 0.403⁎⁎⁎ 1.772 0.564⁎⁎⁎ 1.521 0.476⁎⁎⁎ 1.391
60% 0.422⁎⁎⁎ 1.393 0.371⁎⁎⁎ 1.656 0.422⁎⁎⁎ 1.393 0.342⁎⁎⁎ 1.263
40% 0.326⁎⁎⁎ 1.289 0.314⁎⁎⁎ 1.508 0.326⁎⁎⁎ 1.289 0.242⁎⁎⁎ 1.197
GSP treatment effect
On the treated
M1 54,285 52,025 54,285 53,811
100% 0.851⁎⁎⁎ 2.269 0.487⁎⁎⁎ 2.570 0.850⁎⁎⁎ 2.267 0.732⁎⁎⁎ 2.011
80% 0.757⁎⁎⁎ 2.117 0.492⁎⁎⁎ 2.494 0.757⁎⁎⁎ 2.117 0.588⁎⁎⁎ 1.807
60% 0.693⁎⁎⁎ 1.990 0.379⁎⁎⁎ 1.937 0.693⁎⁎⁎ 1.990 0.507⁎⁎⁎ 1.699
40% 0.665⁎⁎⁎ 1.869 0.271⁎⁎⁎ 1.528 0.665⁎⁎⁎ 1.869 0.410⁎⁎⁎ 1.530
Note:
The effect estimate refers to the D-statistic. All signiﬁcance levels refer to a two-sided test. The effect estimate is signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% signiﬁcance level if indicated by a
superscript of ⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎, or ⁎, respectively. The sensitivity parameter Γ ⁎ is based on a two-sided test at the 5% signiﬁcance level. The distribution used in calculating the critical bound Γ⁎
is R+ unless a superscript − is indicated following the bound Γ⁎, in which case, R− is used. Unless otherwise indicated, the signiﬁcance level of the D-statistic agrees with that of the
R-statistic.
6 We did not report the GSP effect on the untreated, as the GSP does not apply to all
kinds of trading relationships. For example, it is not relevant to propose a GSP between
two poor countries.
7 In Chang and Lee (2010), we also conduct restricted matching within the same
time period, with the periods deﬁned according to the GATT/WTO trade negotiation
rounds. The estimates are almost the same as in unrestricted matching, which is not
surprising, given our ﬁnding below that matched subjects in unrestricted matching
often come from the same year; thus, the criterion of matching within period does not
impose extra restriction in most cases.
8 The number of matched pairs obtained when matching is restricted within the
same dyad shrinks substantially, as some dyads may not have both treated and
untreated observations during the sampling years. For example, the ‘US-Japan’ dyad
has ‘one-in’ (years 1950–1954) and ‘both-in’ (years 1955–1999) observations but does
not have ‘none-in’ observations. In cases like this, dyads without qualiﬁed control/
treated subjects are dropped from the estimation.
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Note that the ‘within-year’ estimates are almost identical to the
benchmark results. This indicates that in unrestricted matching, the
matched subjects are often from the same year; thus, the benchmark
estimates pick up mostly cross-sectional variations. This is under-
standable, as the set of covariates include year dummies, which
encourages matching observations from the same year. A further look
into the data (not reported in the table) at every ﬁve-year interval
(1950, 1955,…, 1995) shows that the positive both-in or one-in effect
is not lumpy in a few particular years but is felt throughout the years,
except in 1975 and 1995 when there is a dip in the membership
effects.
The ‘within-devel.’ analysis reports results when matching is re-
stricted to the same development stage combination, where the com-
binations are: low-income/low-income, low-income/middle-income,
low-income/high-income, middle-income/middle-income, middle-in-
come/high-income, and high-income/high-income dyads. Are the
positivemembership effects shared evenly among countries of different
development stages, or are they concentrated on particular subsets of
countries?A look into thedata (not reported in the table) shows that the
positive effects are indeed concentrated on dyads of middle-income/
middle-income, middle-income/high-income, and high-income/high-
incomecountries. The low-incomecountries donot beneﬁtmuch froma
membership in the GATT/WTO. Similar lumpy patterns were found in
Subramanian and Wei (2007), although we still ﬁnd a positive average
effect while they found no positive average effect.
This asymmetrymay reﬂect the two empirical concernsmentioned
above: that the low-income countries do not signiﬁcantly liberalize
their import sectors despite their membership in the GATT/WTO and
that major export sectors (e.g., agriculture) of low-income countries
still face steep protectionism from the rich world with or without the
GATT/WTO. This kind of heterogeneity in GATT/WTO membership
effects is implied by existing theories of trade agreements; see, for
example, Bagwell and Staiger (2010, pp. 245–247) for a review.
Basically, the two GATT/WTO principles of MFN and reciprocity
actually facilitate this outcome, whereby if countries do not actively
participate in trade negotiations/tariff reductions, other active players
can engineer tariff bargains among themselves that minimize free-
riding by third countries. Thus, by not offering domesticmarket access,
the low-income countries may also face difﬁculty expanding their
export volumes.
5.2. Participation versus formal membership
Tomz et al. (2007) stress the importance of de facto participation in
the multilateral system by nonmembers such as colonies, newly
independent colonies, and provisional members. They share to a large
extent the same set of rights and obligations under the agreement as
formal members. Tomz et al. (2007) classify these territories as
nonmember participants and deﬁne participation to include both
formalmembership and nonmember participation. Based on the same
estimation framework of Rose (2004), they ﬁnd signiﬁcant participa-
tion effects on trade.
Table 6 reports the nonparametric estimates given the data set of
Tomz et al. (2007) and the alternative GATT/WTO indicator. We see
that participation effects are overall stronger thanmembership effects
reported earlier; they are also more robust to hidden selection bias.
This ﬁnding of a larger participation than membership effect is
consistent with the contrasting results reported by Tomz et al. (2007)
and Rose (2004).9
5.3. Kernel-weighting matching versus pair matching
In contrast with pair matching, which uses only the nearest match,
kernel-weighting matching uses multiple potential matches by attach-
ing greater weights to nearer matches. The weighting scheme depends
on the chosen kernel and bandwidth. In this exercise,we use the normal
kernel and deﬁneweights for the potential matches i′t′ of a subject it as
Table 6
Tomz et al. (2007) data set – matching effect estimates and sensitivity.
Caliper Unrestricted Within dyad Within year Within devel.
Effect Γ ⁎ Effect Γ⁎ Effect Γ⁎ Effect Γ ⁎
Both participating in GATT/WTO treatment effect
On the treated
M1 152,986 8,005 152,986 152,986
100% 1.418⁎⁎⁎ 2.426 1.554⁎⁎⁎ 7.535 1.427⁎⁎⁎ 2.439 1.065⁎⁎⁎ 2.099
80% 1.260⁎⁎⁎ 2.284 1.513⁎⁎⁎ 6.689 1.260⁎⁎⁎ 2.284 0.710⁎⁎⁎ 1.626
60% 1.089⁎⁎⁎ 2.058 1.285⁎⁎⁎ 4.969 1.089⁎⁎⁎ 2.058 0.515⁎⁎⁎ 1.382
40% 0.762⁎⁎⁎ 1.706 1.361⁎⁎⁎ 5.134 0.762⁎⁎⁎ 1.706 0.461⁎⁎⁎ 1.324
One participating in GATT/WTO treatment effect
On the treated
M1 71,908 11,637 71,908 71,908
100% 0.818⁎⁎⁎ 1.777 0.852⁎⁎⁎ 2.877 0.822⁎⁎⁎ 1.782 0.464⁎⁎⁎ 1.457
80% 0.631⁎⁎⁎ 1.580 0.716⁎⁎⁎ 2.393 0.631⁎⁎⁎ 1.580 0.278⁎⁎⁎ 1.244
60% 0.444⁎⁎⁎ 1.423 0.738⁎⁎⁎ 2.279 0.444⁎⁎⁎ 1.423 0.290⁎⁎⁎ 1.241
40% 0.304⁎⁎⁎ 1.295 0.546⁎⁎⁎ 1.840 0.304⁎⁎⁎ 1.295 0.172⁎⁎⁎ 1.154
GSP treatment effect
On the treated
M1 54,285 52,025 54,285 54,285
100% 0.824⁎⁎⁎ 2.243 0.485⁎⁎⁎ 2.561 0.823⁎⁎⁎ 2.241 0.688⁎⁎⁎ 1.959
80% 0.726⁎⁎⁎ 2.065 0.480⁎⁎⁎ 2.407 0.726⁎⁎⁎ 2.065 0.569⁎⁎⁎ 1.786
60% 0.667⁎⁎⁎ 1.944 0.375⁎⁎⁎ 1.893 0.667⁎⁎⁎ 1.944 0.489⁎⁎⁎ 1.679
40% 0.621⁎⁎⁎ 1.782 0.265⁎⁎⁎ 1.494 0.621⁎⁎⁎ 1.782 0.401⁎⁎⁎ 1.510
Note: The general notes for Table 5 apply to the current table.
9 As shown in the table, the GSP effect estimates are not exactly the same as those
based on the Rose (2004) data set, for two reasons: ﬁrst, when the GSP effect is
estimated, the participation status of a dyad replaces membership status as part of the
covariates. Second, Tomz et al. (2007) also corrected some coding errors in Rose's data
set, in particular, the income status and geography indicator of some territories (Tomz
et al., 2007, Footnote 32). The second reason also explains the difference in the
number of matched pairs obtained for GSP under ‘within-devel.’ with the alternative
data set.
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where ϕ(⋅) denotes the standard
normal density function, P the dimension of the covariate vector x,
SD(xp) the standard deviation of a covariate xp in the pooled sample,
and h the chosen bandwidth.10 The kernel-weighting matching
estimator is then deﬁned as 1M∑it yit−∑i′t′ w˜it;i′t′yi′t′
 
, where
w˜
it;i′t′≡ wit;i′t′ =∑i′t′ wit;i′t′ is the normalized weight. Table 7
summarizes the results. The effect estimates are very similar to
those obtained by pair matching across types of treatments, calipers,
and the matching criteria.11
5.4. Non-random incidence of positive trade ﬂows
By using the data set of Rose (2004) or Tomz et al. (2007), we have
based our analysis on observations with positive trade ﬂows. Recent
studies byHelpmanet al. (2008) andFelbermayr andKohler (2007) stress
the importance of incorporating observations with zero trade ﬂows in
estimating the gravity equation. In particular, both studiesﬁnd thatGATT/
WTO membership has a positive effect on the formation of bilateral
trading relationships. This suggests that using only observations with
positive trade ﬂowswill induce a downward bias in the effect estimate of
GATT/WTOmembership (and other trade barriers aswell), since a pair of
countries that arenotGATT/WTOmembersbut still observed tradingwith
each other are likely to have lower unobserved trade resistance. Both
studies ﬁnd that consideration of this selection bias alone indeed
strengthens the gravity equation estimates, albeit not considerably.12
Given that we found a strong and positive membership effect
based on positive trade ﬂows, the above selection argument suggests
that incorporating observations with zero trade ﬂows in our analysis
will only strengthen the initial ﬁnding of a positive effect. Thus, we do
not expect our general conclusions to change with the inclusion of
zero trade. Both studies by Helpman et al. (2008) and Felbermayr and
Kohler (2007) are based on parametric estimations of the trade ﬂow
equation, although the former considers parametric as well as
nonparametric estimation of the selection equation. To estimate the
membership effect and also to address the selection into trading in a fully
nonparametric framework, one canpotentially apply thenewlyproposed
methodology of Lee (forthcoming). We leave this considerably more
extensive work for future research, and attempt a less ambitious
approach here to isolating the GATT/WTO membership effect on trade
volumes from its effect on ‘trade start’without resorting to anewdata set
and a full-blown new estimation framework.
Still based on the Rose (2004) data set, we use only observations
where the two countries in a dyad start trading with each other before
ever joining the GATT/WTO. In other words, these dyads have reported
bilateral tradeﬂowsbefore either one of themever joins theGATT/WTO.
Using this sub-sample of dyads that trade with or without the GATT/
WTO membership, the membership effect on prompting new trading
relationships is not present; thus, the effect estimates consist only of the
membership effect on trade volumes. Table 8 presents the effect
estimates for this sub-sample following the same matching procedure
as in the benchmark and restricted cases. We see that this reﬁned
analysis reports overall stronger membership effects, and thus in a way
the results are consistent with the above selection argument.
5.5. Multilateral resistance
Relative trade resistance rather than absolute trade resistance is
argued by some gravity theories to be more appropriate in explaining
bilateral trade ﬂows, cf. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), and thus
multilateral resistance (MR) termsmay have to be controlled for. As their
paper suggested, there are two ways to control for the terms. One is to
solve the endogenous MR terms given the parameter values and then to
estimate the parametric gravity equation incorporating dyads' MR terms
by nonlinear least squares. Both the solution to the endogenousMR terms
and the parametric gravity equation rely on certain functional form
assumptions and thus are subject to speciﬁcation errors as noted by the
authors themselves, which are exactlywhatwe try to avoid in the current
paper. An alternative suggested by the same authors is to replace the MR
terms with country dummies. In a way, we have controlled for dyad-
speciﬁc andhence country-speciﬁc effectswhenweconduct thematching
within the same dyad; the strong effects of GATT/WTO remained. On the
other hand, we do not have a good way in the matching framework to
control for time-varying country-speciﬁc effects as emphasized by some
parametric studies, cf. Subramanian and Wei (2007).
Recent studies by Baier and Bergstrand (2009a,b) present some
potential methods to approximate the endogenous MR terms by
observable exogenous trade resistance covariates and thus the
possibilities to address time-varying MR terms in the matching
framework. Speciﬁcally, in one version of their proposed approxima-
tions, the two country-speciﬁc MR terms for a dyad are decomposed
into a list of MR terms associated with each trade resistance covariate.
For example, theMR term for a trade resistance covariate xkmtr between
countries k andm in year twould beMRxkmtr =(1/N)∑m′=1N xkm′tr +(1/
N)∑k′=1N xk′mtr −(1/N2)∑k′=1N ∑m′=1N xk′m′tr , reﬂecting the respec-
tive average trade resistance of the two countries to all their trading
partners, adjusted by a typical country's average resistance to all its
trading partners. One can add this list of MR terms to the list of
covariates already used in thematching.13 Speciﬁcally, to estimate the
both-in treatment effect, we follow the samematching procedure as in
the benchmark case but with the modiﬁed list of matching covariates
Table 7
Rose (2004) data set – kernel-weighting matching effect estimates.
Caliper Unrestricted Within dyad Within year Within devel.
Both in GATT/WTO treatment effect
On the treated
100% 1.323 0.929 1.284 0.962
80% 1.078 0.764 1.076 0.778
60% 0.840 0.835 0.837 0.542
40% 0.558 0.799 0.554 0.396
One in GATT/WTO treatment effect
On the treated
100% 0.753 0.484 0.748 0.604
80% 0.573 0.423 0.571 0.483
60% 0.436 0.393 0.433 0.353
40% 0.344 0.342 0.341 0.260
GSP treatment effect
On the treated
100% 0.874 0.491 0.863 0.744
80% 0.786 0.497 0.773 0.605
60% 0.731 0.384 0.712 0.544
40% 0.709 0.277 0.688 0.456
10 For matching within dyad where the number Nit of potential comparison subjects
for a subject it is small, we use a larger bandwidth h=0.5Nit−1/(P+4); otherwise, we
use a smaller bandwidth h=0.25Nit−1/(P+4) (the computation hits numerical bounds
for smaller bandwidths than this).
11 We set calipers in the same fashion as in pair matching, such that subject it that
does not have a good match in terms of the scale-normalized distance is discarded. We
also experiment with larger bandwidths. As the chosen bandwidth is enlarged, the
point effect estimates tend to increase. Thus, we may consider the pair matching
estimates as overall conservative estimates.
12 Helpman et al. (2008) also distinguish the direct partial effect of trade resistance
on trade ﬂows from its indirect effect on trade ﬂows through changes in the number of
exporters. In this paper, we have not made this distinction. In our view, the larger
trade ﬂows due to an increase in the number of exporters should also be considered as
part of the beneﬁt of GATT/WTO membership. Thus, the matching estimates presented
correspond to the total effect of GATT/WTO membership, including both the direct and
indirect effects.
13 Alternatively, one can construct the relative trade resistance covariate BVxkmtr ≡ xkmtr −
MRxkmt
r and use it in place of the absolute trade resistance covariate xkmtr in thematching, as
done in Baier and Bergstrand (2009b). We take the former approach, as it imposes less
structure.
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that include the same economic size covariates (lrgdp, lrgdppc, lareap),
the trade resistance covariates (ldist, comlang, …, regional, gsp) and
their corresponding MR terms, year dummies, and the MR term of the
treatment dummy.14 Similar adjustments are made to the list of
matching covariates for one-in and GSP effect estimation.
The results are summarized in Table 9. When the multilateral
resistance terms are controlled for, we see that the strong both-in
effects on the treated remain. In contrast, the one-in treatment effects
now become weaker overall with statistically signiﬁcant but small
trade promoting effects. The ‘within-year’matching results are almost
identical to the unrestricted case, reﬂecting again the fact that in the
unrestricted case, mostmatched observations are across sections from
the same year. The ‘within-dyad’ estimates of the both-in and one-in
effects are comparable to those in Table 5 without the MR terms
controlled for. This suggests that the MR terms do not vary much
across years for a given dyad, and hence the extra control does not
affect the matching signiﬁcantly. When matching is restricted within
the same relative development stage, the mean both-in effect again
masks a large variation across dyads of different development stages
(not reported in the table), with large beneﬁts tending to concentrate
on higher income dyads but costs on lower income dyads.15
5.6. Difference-in-difference matching estimator
In this section, we explore an alternative treatment effect concept,
difference-in-difference (DD), which is based on weaker identiﬁca-
tion assumptions. This method compares the difference over time in
trade volumes of a treated dyad to that of a comparable untreated
dyad. Consider a time period [t−b, t+a] around the treatment timing
t with a, bN0. Using our notations, the DD treatment effect estimand
is:
DD = E yt+a−yt−b jd = 1; x
 
−E yt+a−yt−b jd = 0; x
 
= E y1t+a−y0t−b jd = 1; x
 
−E y0t+a−y0t−b jd = 0; x
 
= E y1t+a−y0t+a jd = 1; x
  ð5Þ
if the same time-effect condition E(yt+a0 −yt−b0 |d=1, x)=E(yt+a0 −yt−b0 |
d=0, x) holds. That is, DD identiﬁes the treatment effect on the treated
at time t+a if the potential untreated response changes by the same
magnitude on average over the time period [t−b, t+a] for
comparable treated and untreated dyads. This identifying assump-
tion is weaker than E(y0|d=1, x)=E(y0|d=0, x) required for the
effect on the treated (cf. Section 2.1) and thus is more robust to
hidden bias due to selection on unobservables. For example, the same
time-effect condition allows potential systematic unobserved dyadic
heterogeneities across the treatment and control groups or system-
atic time trends in trade volumes unrelated to the treatment, as long
as the time trends are on average the same for comparable dyads. See
Heckman et al. (1997) for DD estimation based on matching, and
Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and the references therein for other
DD approaches.
To estimate DD, we carry out matching in a fashion similar to
Section 2.1. In particular, start with a both-in treated dyad. If the dyad
was ﬁrst treated in year t, the pool of potential matches for this dyad
are dyads thatwere not in theGATT/WTO throughout the period [t−b,
t+a]. The best match is identiﬁed based on the baseline response and
the covariates in the pre-treatment year (yt−b, xt−b).16 Given the
match, the difference over time in trade ﬂows (yt+a0 −yt−b0 ) of the
control dyad is subtracted from the difference over time (yt+ a1 −yt−b0 )
of the treated dyad. Given M matched pairs, DD is estimated by the
sample average of the pair-wise differences in differences. The one-in
and the GSP treatment analysis are carried out in a similar fashion.
Note that we have included the baseline response yt−b in the list of
matching covariates. This is to control for potential unobservables
that may systematically affect trade ﬂows but are not captured by
the observables xt−b, and thus to reduce the scope of selection on
unobservables.
Some remarks are in order. First, selecting the lead and lag years (a,
b) is difﬁcult. One guideline is whether the same time effect condition
will hold given the choice of (a, b). As noted earlier, policy changes do
not necessarily coincide with the ofﬁcial year of GATT/WTO accession.
Some countries may undertake structural changes required for the
accession beforehand or economic agents may act in anticipation of
the upcoming accession. Thus, trade ﬂows may well have changed
before the ofﬁcial accession of the treated dyad, and to satisfy the
same time effect condition, a large b may be required. On the other
hand, it is quite often true that acceding countries take several years to
Table 8
Rose (2004) data set – trading relationship exists before GATT/WTO membership.
Caliper Unrestricted Within dyad Within year Within devel.
Effect Γ ⁎ Effect Γ⁎ Effect Γ⁎ Effect Γ ⁎
Both in GATT/WTO treatment effect
On the treated
M1 19,760 19,760 19,760 19,522
100% 1.599⁎⁎⁎ 2.983 1.032⁎⁎⁎ 3.372 1.606⁎⁎⁎ 2.983 1.302⁎⁎⁎ 2.364
80% 1.447⁎⁎⁎ 2.660 0.836⁎⁎⁎ 2.726 1.447⁎⁎⁎ 2.660 1.157⁎⁎⁎ 2.086
60% 1.149⁎⁎⁎ 2.195 0.886⁎⁎⁎ 2.885 1.149⁎⁎⁎ 2.195 0.909⁎⁎⁎ 1.771
40% 0.861⁎⁎⁎ 1.817 0.821⁎⁎⁎ 2.586 0.861⁎⁎⁎ 1.817 0.639⁎⁎⁎ 1.469
One in GATT/WTO treatment effect
On the treated
M1 23,463 23,463 23,463 23,384
100% 0.986⁎⁎⁎ 2.060 0.469⁎⁎⁎ 1.935 0.985⁎⁎⁎ 2.058 0.903⁎⁎⁎ 1.879
80% 0.758⁎⁎⁎ 1.743 0.392⁎⁎⁎ 1.753 0.758⁎⁎⁎ 1.743 0.691⁎⁎⁎ 1.609
60% 0.615⁎⁎⁎ 1.590 0.351⁎⁎⁎ 1.653 0.615⁎⁎⁎ 1.590 0.492⁎⁎⁎ 1.384
40% 0.535⁎⁎⁎ 1.491 0.354⁎⁎⁎ 1.621 0.535⁎⁎⁎ 1.491 0.415⁎⁎⁎ 1.320
Note: The general notes for Table 5 apply to the current table.
14 Note that we have included the MR term of bothin in the list of matching
covariates in estimating the both-in treatment effect; thus, the estimated both-in
effect corresponds to its partial equilibrium effect and not its potential general
equilibrium effect (the estimation of which goes against the typical assumption of
matching estimation). In the context of free trade agreements (FTAs) that Baier and
Bergstrand (2009b) studied, they argued that the effect of the MR term of their
treatment dummy, FTA, was conceptually negligible.
15 The GSP treatment effects are stronger with the MR terms controlled for as in the
case of both-in effects.
16 The same scale-normalized distance measure is used, with the sample variance of
(yt− b, xt− b) calculated based on all observations in year t−b.
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phase in the agreed-upon trade policy changes, and thus one may
expect the treatment effect to manifest itself only years later. A large a
may address this concern. However, choosing too large a window (a,
b) may pose two problems: ﬁrst, the sample size will be signiﬁcantly
reduced as not all dyads have observations in long extended periods;
second, with a long window, other factors not controlled for (by the
same time effect condition and the matching covariates) may affect
the trade ﬂows and contaminate the result. We experiment with
several symmetric windows: a=b={1, 2, s..., 6}. Another remark
worth making is that a dyad typically went from a none-in period to a
one-in period and then to a both-in period, if it was ever both-in
treated. It is relatively rare for the countries in a dyad to simul-
taneously join the GATT/WTO and to go directly from none-in to both-
in. To maintain reasonable sample sizes, we allow both scenarios of
pre-treatment status (none-in or one-in) in estimating the both-in
treatment effect. Thus, the both-in effect estimate is a mixture of the
two effects when the dyad goes from one-in to both-in and when the
dyad goes from none-in to both-in, relative to if it stays none-in
throughout the interval. The one-in and the GSP effect analysis are
spared such complications.
The ﬁndings are summarized in Fig. 2. The results are similar across
different caliper choices. In general, the GATT/WTO trade effects are
negligible in early phases of the membership, but become statistically
and economically signiﬁcant ﬁve or six years after the treatment. At
year six, an average dyad's bilateral trade ﬂows increase roughly by
65% (=e0.5−1). Similar patterns apply to the both-in or one-in
treatment. In contrast, the GSP effect is small if not negligible and
manifests itself relatively quickly following the treatment. The effect
remains relatively stable throughout the years, and is statistically
insigniﬁcant in most cases.
These ﬁndings seem to agree with the casual observations and our
discussions above regarding the gradual phase-in of policy changes
after an ofﬁcial GATT/WTO accession. It may also be reconcilable with
the larger benchmark and restricted matching estimates shown in
Tables 4 and 5. In these earlier exercises, we did not control for the
vintage of the treated observations; thus, the treatment effect estimate
effectively summarizes the effects across all vintages following the
treatment for as far as several decades. If the effect is larger, the more
aged the treatment is, a larger effect estimate observed in the previous
exercises is understandable.
5.6.1. Placebo exercise
In this section,we conduct “placebo” exercises to verify that the time
trends of trade ﬂows of matched dyads are comparable in advance of
membership. A ﬁnding against differences in pre-trends would help
alleviate concerns that the DD estimates may be picking up systematic
differences in time trends between the treatment and control groups
due to unobservables not controlled for in our matching exercise.
To do so, we apply the DD estimation procedure to a bogus treat-
ment year t′= t−d that predates the actual year of treatment t (here
identiﬁed as the ﬁrst year when either country in a treated dyad joins
the GATT/WTO). As there is no treatment at the bogus treatment year,
the DD estimate, instead of estimating the treatment effect, captures
the difference in the time trends between comparable treated and
untreated dyads in advance of GATT/WTO membership.
As discussed above, countries may undertake policy reforms in
advance of membership, and their trade patterns may well have
changed years before the ofﬁcial year of accession. Thus, the period of
comparison of the pre-trends has to be set reasonably far into the past,
such that it does not overlap with the likely period of transition to the
accession. For this, we experiment with d={7,…, 12} and symmetric
DD windows a=b={1, …, 6}, with d−a≥6. That is, the period of
comparison of the pre-trends will be at least six years before the
actual year of treatment. For example, if the bogus treatment year is
set 10 years before the actual treatment year, the forward/backward
window for DD estimation can range from one to four years.
The results are summarized in Table 10. As can be seen from the
table, of the 21 possible periods of comparison (and of the four caliper
choices for eachperiod), all estimates are not signiﬁcantlydifferent from
zero, except three estimates that are signiﬁcantly negative (which does
not go against a ﬁnding of positive treatment effects). Thus, on the
whole, there is no evidence of systematic differences in the time trends
in advance of membership between comparable treated and untreated
dyads.
6. Potential problems with the parametric gravity estimates
The discrepancy between the current nonparametric matching
estimates and the conventional parametric gravity estimates suggests
that the empirical gravitymodels used in the parametric studiesmay be
misspeciﬁed. Inparticular, guidedby thepattern ofnonparametric effect
Table 9
Rose (2004) data set – with multilateral resistance terms.
Caliper Unrestricted Within dyad Within year Within devel.
Effect Γ ⁎ Effect Γ⁎ Effect Γ⁎ Effect Γ ⁎
Both in GATT/WTO treatment effect
On the treated
M1 114,750 19,760 114,750 112,959
100% 1.622⁎⁎⁎ 2.616 0.942⁎⁎⁎ 3.170 1.618⁎⁎⁎ 2.605 1.243⁎⁎⁎ 2.041
80% 1.355⁎⁎⁎ 2.273 0.778⁎⁎⁎ 2.594 1.355⁎⁎⁎ 2.273 0.750⁎⁎⁎ 1.543
60% 1.130⁎⁎⁎ 2.023 0.850⁎⁎⁎ 2.858 1.130⁎⁎⁎ 2.023 0.659⁎⁎⁎ 1.452
40% 0.894⁎⁎⁎ 1.798 0.845⁎⁎⁎ 2.624 0.894⁎⁎⁎ 1.798 0.569⁎⁎⁎ 1.375
One in GATT/WTO treatment effect
On the treated
M1 98,810 23,463 98,810 98,363
100% 0.627⁎⁎⁎ 1.560 0.454⁎⁎⁎ 1.903 0.627⁎⁎⁎ 1.560 0.455⁎⁎⁎ 1.385
80% 0.401⁎⁎⁎ 1.368 0.399⁎⁎⁎ 1.761 0.401⁎⁎⁎ 1.368 0.270⁎⁎⁎ 1.230
60% 0.246⁎⁎⁎ 1.242 0.371⁎⁎⁎ 1.650 0.246⁎⁎⁎ 1.242 0.209⁎⁎⁎ 1.194
40% 0.252⁎⁎⁎ 1.267 0.374⁎⁎⁎ 1.612 0.252⁎⁎⁎ 1.267 0.107⁎⁎⁎ 1.124
GSP treatment effect
On the treated
M1 54,285 52,025 54,285 53,811
100% 1.044⁎⁎⁎ 2.243 0.485⁎⁎⁎ 2.559 1.043⁎⁎⁎ 2.242 0.954⁎⁎⁎ 2.183
80% 1.060⁎⁎⁎ 2.309 0.494⁎⁎⁎ 2.624 1.060⁎⁎⁎ 2.309 0.948⁎⁎⁎ 2.195
60% 0.954⁎⁎⁎ 2.139 0.456⁎⁎⁎ 2.261 0.954⁎⁎⁎ 2.139 0.762⁎⁎⁎ 1.869
40% 0.872⁎⁎⁎ 2.023 0.325⁎⁎⁎ 1.679 0.872⁎⁎⁎ 2.023 0.712⁎⁎⁎ 1.748
Note: The general notes for Table 5 apply to the current table.
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estimates observed above, we suspect that heterogeneous treatment
effects can be important. While our matching estimator allows for
heterogeneous effects that vary with the observed covariates, the
speciﬁcations used in Rose (2004) basically assume homogeneous
GATT/WTO effects. Subramanian and Wei (2007) allow for heteroge-
neous effects in the parametric framework but only across certain
subsets of samples. In this section, we explore generalizing the para-
metric gravitymodel to allow formore arbitrary formsof heterogeneous
effects and verify whether the discrepancy in ﬁndings between the
nonparametric and parametric approaches might be reduced. To work
toward this, we introduce ﬁrst-order interaction terms of the GATT/
WTO indicators with the other covariates.17
The results are summarized in Table 11. As shown, when only the
bothin GATT/WTO indicator is allowed to interact with the other co-
variates, the general ﬁnding does not change, although many of
the interaction terms are signiﬁcant. As both the bothin and onein
GATT/WTO indicators are allowed to interact with the other covariates,
the mean effects of both membership statuses become signiﬁcantly
positive. Many of the interaction terms are statistically signiﬁcant, and
the defaultmodel is rejected in favor of the alternativemodel.While the
estimates for the main gravity covariates (such as distance and GDP)
remain stable across speciﬁcations, estimates for the other covariates
are not, suggesting that the modeling of these augmenting covariates
(typically used to control for the degree of trade resistance) is
problematic. Basically, the parametric effect estimates of these
augmenting trade resistance covariates are very sensitive to the model
speciﬁcations. This may help explain some of the disagreements in the
gravity literature regarding the currency union effect (Persson, 2001;
Rose, 2001) or the free trade agreement effect (Frankel, 1997; Baier and
Bergstrand, 2007).
Finally, as the gsp dummy is also allowed to interact with the other
covariates, the mean effect estimates of the both-in and the one-in
membership status remain signiﬁcantly positive. The GSP mean effect
estimate is, however, rather similar to its marginal effect estimate in
the default speciﬁcation. This suggests that allowing for heteroge-
neous GSP effects helps in increasing the explanatory power of the
model but the degree of heterogeneity is not strong, compared with
the both-in and one-in effects. This also agrees with the ﬁndings of the
matching framework above: while the GSP effect estimates are
relatively stable across the choice of calipers, the both-in and one-in
effect estimates vary a lot, and while the GSP effect estimates are
relatively similar across the parametric and nonparametric ap-
proaches, the membership effect estimates are very different across
the two approaches.
Based on the results in the last column of Table 11, it appears that
the both-in and one-in membership effects are intensiﬁed by the GDP
per capita and the physical areas of the dyad, and are also intensiﬁed if
the countries in a dyad share a common language, were ever in a
colonial relationship, or belong to a common currency union. Over-
all, the explorations above suggest that it is important in practice
to recognize the potential heterogeneity in the trade effects of GATT/
WTO membership.
In the Rose (2004) default speciﬁcation, the MR terms are not
controlled for. We also explored controlling for the MR terms before
proceeding with the same experiment as above of adding interaction
terms. In particular, we follow Subramanian and Wei (2007) and use
time-varying country dummies as proxies for the MR terms in the Rose
17 We also explore adding quadratic terms of continuous/categorical covariates and
interactions of these covariates with all other binary covariates (other than the
treatment variables themselves) to the Rose (2004) default speciﬁcation. Many of
these terms are signiﬁcant, but the OLS estimates of the membership effects are not
affected signiﬁcantly.
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Fig. 2.Difference-in-differencematching estimates. Note: 1. The horizontal axis indicates the years of lead and lag (a, b) used in the DD estimation; here, symmetric leads and lags are
used. The vertical axis (not labeled) indicates the treatment effect magnitude. 2. The solid line indicates the treatment effect point estimate. The dashed lines indicate the 95% CI
based on the permutation test. 3. The sample size (the number of qualiﬁed matched pairs) for each treatment scenario is as follows. Both-in: 3600 (1 year), 3216 (2 years), 2955
(3 years), 2461 (4 years), 2277 (5 years), 1812 (6 years). One-in: 1303 (1 year), 1110 (2 years), 1022 (3 years), 828 (4 years), 736 (5 years), 651 (6 years). GSP: 2231 (1 year), 2184
(2 years), 2031 (3 years), 1976 (4 years), 1913 (5 years), 1859 (6 years). These correspond to the sample size used in the 100% caliper choice.
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(2004) parametric framework.18 The ﬁndings are similar to those above
without the MR terms controlled for. The both-in and one-in effect
estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant by controlling for theMR terms
alone. By incorporating the interaction terms of the membership
indicators with the other covariates, the effects turn signiﬁcantly
positive. The set of statistically signiﬁcant interaction terms are similar:
e.g., GDP per capita, a common language, and having been in a colonial
relationship tend to strengthen the membership effects.
As the dimension of the covariate vector is high in the current
application, there aremanypotential functional forms for the interaction
terms. For example, theGATT/WTO indicatorsmay also interactwith the
interaction terms of the other covariates (this is where nonparametric
methods come in particularly useful; nonparametric methods deliver
ﬁndings without the need to search for the correct speciﬁcation). By
considering only the ﬁrst-order interaction terms, we have stopped
short of fully explaining away the discrepancy between the effect
estimates of the nonparametric and parametric approaches. Nonethe-
less, our limited search suggests that the assumption of homogeneous
treatment effects could be a major source of misspeciﬁcation. The
nonparametric framework we propose in this paper offers a convenient
estimation framework to accommodate heterogeneous treatment
effects and at the same time circumvents the speciﬁcation difﬁculty in
a high-dimensional application.
7. Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on the effects of GATT/WTO
membership/participation on actual trade ﬂows. Previous studies of
this issue have largely relied on parametric estimation of gravity-
based trade models. Concerns about parametric misspeciﬁcations,
Table 10
Rose (2004) data set – placebo exercise.
DD window
(years)
Caliper Years before the actual treatment year
12 11 10
Effect 95% CI Effect 95% CI Effect 95% CI
1 100% 0.040 [−0.107, 0.187] −0.064 [−0.219, 0.090] 0.052 [−0.088, 0.192]
80% −0.003 [−0.171, 0.166] −0.118 [−0.289, 0.053] 0.037 [−0.115, 0.189]
60% −0.025 [−0.224, 0.174] −0.202 [−0.390,−0.013] 0.026 [−0.156, 0.207]
40% −0.024 [−0.243, 0.195] −0.264 [−0.498,−0.030] 0.014 [−0.209, 0.238]
2 100% −0.025 [−0.201, 0.152] 0.010 [−0.161, 0.180] −0.006 [−0.180, 0.169]
80% −0.080 [−0.282, 0.123] −0.088 [−0.283, 0.106] −0.006 [−0.202, 0.191]
60% −0.038 [−0.276, 0.199] −0.044 [−0.279, 0.191] −0.061 [−0.290, 0.167]
40% −0.054 [−0.360, 0.253] −0.050 [−0.337, 0.237] −0.065 [−0.340, 0.209]
3 100% 0.092 [−0.139, 0.324] 0.145 [−0.057, 0.346] 0.010 [−0.175, 0.196]
80% 0.196 [−0.070, 0.463] 0.181 [−0.052, 0.415] −0.044 [−0.249, 0.160]
60% 0.234 [−0.039, 0.507] 0.067 [−0.182, 0.317] −0.065 [−0.294, 0.164]
40% 0.061 [−0.261, 0.383] 0.146 [−0.148, 0.440] −0.089 [−0.353, 0.175]
4 100% 0.012 [−0.198, 0.222] −0.027 [−0.239, 0.185] −0.019 [−0.223, 0.185]
80% 0.024 [−0.208, 0.257] 0.057 [−0.196, 0.311] 0.039 [−0.190, 0.268]
60% −0.007 [−0.277, 0.263] 0.007 [−0.294, 0.308] 0.122 [−0.137, 0.382]
40% −0.007 [−0.363, 0.349] −0.062 [−0.426, 0.301] 0.164 [−0.151, 0.479]
5 100% −0.166 [−0.411, 0.079] −0.213 [−0.438, 0.012]
80% −0.116 [−0.391, 0.159] −0.240 [−0.491, 0.011]
60% −0.121 [−0.434, 0.193] −0.304 [−0.606,−0.003]
40% −0.133 [−0.508, 0.243] −0.304 [−0.658, 0.049]
6 100% −0.138 [−0.425, 0.149]
80% −0.105 [−0.430, 0.220]
60% −0.015 [−0.388, 0.357]
40% −0.230 [−0.651, 0.191]
Years before the actual treatment year
9 8 7
Effect 95% CI Effect 95% CI Effect 95% CI
1 100% 0.134 [−0.011, 0.278] −0.039 [−0.172, 0.093] 0.106 [−0.031, 0.243]
80% 0.090 [−0.065, 0.244] −0.035 [−0.169, 0.100] 0.078 [−0.069, 0.225]
60% 0.061 [−0.115, 0.238] −0.002 [−0.164, 0.160] 0.036 [−0.135, 0.206]
40% 0.116 [−0.091, 0.324] −0.011 [−0.214, 0.192] 0.021 [−0.187, 0.230]
2 100% −0.072 [−0.232, 0.089] 0.058 [−0.094, 0.209]
80% −0.072 [−0.255, 0.111] 0.058 [−0.097, 0.214]
60% −0.047 [−0.245, 0.150] −0.004 [−0.174, 0.167]
40% −0.009 [−0.264, 0.246] −0.003 [−0.213, 0.206]
3 100% −0.104 [−0.280, 0.073]
80% −0.077 [−0.271, 0.117]
60% −0.044 [−0.263, 0.175]
40% −0.084 [−0.359, 0.191]
Note:
1. The estimation proceeds as described in Section 5.6 for DD estimation, but with a bogus treatment year t′= t−d used, where d={7, …, 12}, which predates the actual year of
treatment t (here identiﬁed as the ﬁrst year when either country in a treated dyad joins the GATT/WTO).
2. The DD window refers to the years of lead and lag (a, b) used in the DD estimation, where it is set that a=b.
3. The effect refers to the bogus treatment effect on the treated dyad when using the bogus treatment year.
4. The effect estimates that are signiﬁcantly negative are indicated by CI's in italics.
18 Instead of using the complete Rose (2004) data set, only observations at every ﬁve
years between 1950 and 1995 are used. This is to keep the number of time-varying
country dummies computationally manageable; see Subramanian and Wei (2007) for
the same approach. Five variables―lrgdp, lrgdppc, landl, island, lareap―are dropped
from the list of regressors, as their coefﬁcients cannot be precisely estimated with the
presence of time-varying country dummies; their higher-order terms or interaction
terms with the other covariates can still be included, however.
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heterogeneousmembership effects, and unobserved selection bias are
raised by the current paper and addressed by using nonparametric
methods. In particular, a pair-matching estimator is used to obtain the
point effect estimates, permutation tests to derive the inferences, and
a sensitivity analysis based on signed-rank tests to evaluate the
robustness of the inferences to unobserved confounders.
Our ﬁndings suggest that membership in the GATT/WTO has a
signiﬁcant trade-promoting effect for dyads that have both chosen to
Table 11
Parametric gravity estimates with heterogeneous treatment effects.
ltrade Rose default Heter. both-in effect Heter. both-in/one-in effect Heter. both-in/one-in/gsp effect
ldist −1.119 (0.022) −1.112 (0.028) −1.099 (0.060) −1.100 (0.060)
lrgdp 0.916 (0.010) 0.900 (0.012) 0.858 (0.027) 0.858 (0.027)
lrgdppc 0.321 (0.014) 0.246 (0.019) 0.045 (0.044) 0.044 (0.044)
comlang 0.313 (0.040) 0.259 (0.053) 0.092 (0.107) 0.091 (0.107)
border 0.526 (0.111) 0.475 (0.122) 0.560 (0.190) 0.558 (0.190)
landl −0.271 (0.031) −0.253 (0.041) −0.174 (0.086) −0.173 (0.086)
island 0.042 (0.036) 0.043 (0.048) 0.108 (0.116) 0.109 (0.116)
lareap −0.097 (0.008) −0.122 (0.010) −0.171 (0.023) −0.171 (0.023)
comcol 0.585 (0.067) 0.669 (0.084) 1.080 (0.158) 1.079 (0.158)
curcol 1.075 (0.235) 2.780 (0.356) 4.812 (0.570) 4.810 (0.570)
colony 1.164 (0.117) 1.076 (0.152) −0.526 (0.210) −0.522 (0.209)
comctry −0.016 (1.081) 0.056 (1.035) 0.047 (1.035) 0.333 (1.035)
custrict 1.118 (0.122) 0.624 (0.177) 0.038 (0.325) 0.037 (0.324)
regional 1.199 (0.106) 1.435 (0.154) 0.576 (0.392) 0.573 (0.391)
bothin −0.042 (0.053) −4.587 (0.636) −10.720 (1.102) −10.260 (1.124)
onein −0.058 (0.049) −0.056 (0.048) −7.606 (1.075) −7.402 (1.078)
gsp 0.859 (0.032) 1.127 (0.048) 0.556 (0.258) −2.214 (0.760)
bothin×ldist −0.017 (0.037) −0.030 (0.065) −0.054 (0.066)
bothin×lrgdp 0.029 (0.016) 0.071 (0.029) 0.057 (0.030)
bothin×lrgdppc 0.134 (0.025) 0.335 (0.047) 0.343 (0.048)
bothin×comlang 0.134 (0.067) 0.301 (0.117) 0.248 (0.121)
bothin×border 0.109 (0.197) 0.024 (0.254) 0.027 (0.250)
bothin×landl −0.048 (0.052) −0.127 (0.093) −0.117 (0.096)
bothin×island −0.035 (0.059) −0.101 (0.123) −0.075 (0.124)
bothin×lareap 0.052 (0.013) 0.101 (0.024) 0.114 (0.025)
bothin×comcol −0.193 (0.114) −0.606 (0.180) −0.584 (0.180)
bothin×curcol −1.890 (0.443) −3.914 (0.621) −3.737 (0.637)
bothin×colony 0.088 (0.186) 1.692 (0.253) 1.584 (0.281)
bothin×custrict 0.784 (0.219) 1.374 (0.352) 1.324 (0.352)
bothin×regional −0.589 (0.193) 0.271 (0.409) 0.237 (0.409)
bothin×gsp −0.458 (0.054) 0.108 (0.260) −0.051 (0.281)
onein×ldist −0.013 (0.063) −0.030 (0.064)
onein×lrgdp 0.053 (0.029) 0.045 (0.029)
onein×lrgdppc 0.246 (0.047) 0.252 (0.047)
onein×comlang 0.273 (0.116) 0.249 (0.117)
onein×border −0.077 (0.230) −0.093 (0.229)
onein×landl −0.099 (0.091) −0.094 (0.091)
onein×island −0.100 (0.119) −0.083 (0.119)
onein×lareap 0.057 (0.024) 0.065 (0.024)
onein×comcol −0.580 (0.175) −0.568 (0.175)
onein×colony 1.708 (0.239) 1.609 (0.261)
onein×custrict 0.674 (0.369) 0.647 (0.374)
onein×regional 1.167 (0.409) 1.079 (0.415)
onein×gsp 0.479 (0.261) 0.362 (0.281)
gsp×ldist 0.180 (0.045)
gsp×lrgdp 0.062 (0.018)
gsp×lrgdppc −0.018 (0.029)
gsp×comlang 0.188 (0.074)
gsp×border −1.545 (0.383)
gsp×landl −0.038 (0.060)
gsp×island −0.135 (0.064)
gsp×lareap −0.054 (0.014)
gsp×curcol −0.585 (0.402)
gsp×colony 0.141 (0.191)
gsp×comctry −1.421 (1.074)
gsp×custrict 0.169 (0.278)
gsp×regional 0.635 (0.279)
mean bothin effect −0.042 (0.053) −0.043 (0.001) 0.272 (0.002) 0.240 (0.002)
mean onein effect −0.058 (0.049) −0.056 (0.048) 0.272 (0.002) 0.241 (0.001)
mean gsp effect 0.859 (0.032) 1.127 (0.048) 0.556 (0.258) 0.718 (0.001)
R2 0.6480 0.6504† 0.6525† 0.6530†
Note:
1. OLS with year effects (intercepts not reported). Robust standard errors (clustering by dyads) are in the parenthesis. Some interaction terms are dropped due to collinearity.
2. When an effect is heterogeneous, the subject-wise effect equals the main effect plus the interaction effects scaled by the subject's covariates. The mean effect is estimated by the
sample average of the subject-wise effects. When an effect is assumed homogeneous, the mean effect estimate records the marginal effect estimate.
3. A superscript † over the R2 value indicates that the restricted default model (Rr2) is rejected in favor of the unrestricted model (Ru2) at the conventional signiﬁcance levels by the χq2
test of (N−κ)(Ru2−Rr2)/(1−Ru2), where N is the sample size, κ the number of parameters in the unrestricted model, and q the difference in the numbers of parameters in the
restricted and unrestricted models.
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be members. The effect is larger than bilateral trade preference
arrangements, GSP, and larger than when only one country in a dyad
has chosen to be a member. Although the GSP effect appears to be
relatively constant across subjects, the both-in and one-in effects
display substantial heterogeneities. The ﬁnding of a positive both-in
effect is quite robust to potential unobserved confounders.
The overall conclusion does not change when we restrict the
matching to observations from the same dyad (thus, capturing the
within effect), the same year (thus, capturing the between effect), or
the same relative development stage. The overall conclusion does not
change either when we use participation status instead of formal
membership as the treatment indicator, or when we use kernel-
weighting matching instead of pair-matching. The results are also
robust to using only observations where a dyad's trading relationship
exists before either country in the dyad ever joins the GATT/WTO
(thus, isolating the membership's effect on trade volumes from its
effect on the formation of trading relationships), and robust to
controlling for time-varying multilateral resistance terms in the
matching framework. A ﬁnal robustness check using the difference-
in-difference matching estimator reveals that the signiﬁcant and
positive GATT/WTO effect on trade takes several years after the ofﬁcial
accession before manifesting itself.
The contrast between the results of the current paper and those of
Rose (2004) suggests that conventional gravity models may be
misspeciﬁed. We show that the assumption of homogeneous member-
ship effects may be a major source of misspeciﬁcation. The nonpara-
metric framework we propose in this paper offers a convenient
estimation framework to accommodate heterogeneous treatment
effects and at the same time circumvents the speciﬁcation difﬁculty in
a high-dimensional application.
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Appendix A. Permutation test for matched pairs
Recall that D′≡ 1M∑Mm = 1wmsm ym1−ym2ð Þ, where only the permu-
tation variablewm is randomwith P(wm=1)=P(wm=−1)=0.5, con-
ditional on the observed data. Hence, E(D′)=0 and VðD′Þ = E D′ð 2Þ =
1
M2∑Mm = 1 E w2ms2m

ym1−ym2ð Þ2g = 1M2∑Mm = 1 yð m1−ym2Þ2. By apply-
ing the central limit theorem to wm's, the exact p-value of D can be
approximated by
P D′ ≥Dð Þ = P D′
∑Mm=1 ym1−ym2ð Þ2 =M2
 1=2 ≥ D∑Mm=1 ym1−ym2ð Þ2 =M2 1=2
( )
≃ P N 0;1ð Þ≥ D
∑Mm=1 ym1−ym2ð Þ2 =M2
 1=2
( )
:
We can obtain the CI for themean effect by inverting the above test
procedure. For instance, suppose that the treatment effect isβm for pair
m. Deﬁne the mean effect β≡ 1M∑Mm = 1βm. In this case, the no-effect
situation is restoredby replacing ym1with ym1−βmwhen sm=1or ym2
with ym2−βm when sm=−1:
Dβ ≡
1
M
∑
M
m=1
sm ym1−smβm−ym2ð Þ =
1
M
∑
M
m=1
sm ym1−ym2ð Þ−
1
M
∑
M
m=1
βm
=
1
M
∑
M
m=1
sm ym1−ym2ð Þ−β;
and the permutation test can be applied. Deﬁne accordingly D′β≡
1
M∑Mm = 1wm sm ym1−ym2ð Þ−β

 
to observe E D′β
 
= 0 and V D′β
 
=
1
M2∑Mm = 1 sm ym1−ym2ð Þ−β

 2
. Now conduct level-α tests with
Dβ
∑Mm=1 sm ym1−ym2ð Þ−β

 2
=M2
n o1=2
:
ð6Þ
The collectionof β values that are not rejectedusing(6) is the (1−α)
100% CI for β. In the above framework, we have generalized the
procedure to allow for heterogeneous treatment effects, and as such, the
CI constructed is for the mean effect β. Clearly, this framework includes
homogeneous treatment effects as a special case when βm=β for allm.
Appendix B. Signed-rank test for matched pairs
The permuted version R′ for R can be written as R′≡∑m=1M rm1
[wmsmN0]=∑m=1M rm(1[wm=1, sm=1]+1[wm=−1, sm=−1]).
Note that rm's and sm's are ﬁxed conditional on the data and the only
thing random is the permutation variable wm. Thus, under the H0 of
exchangeability, E(R′)=∑m=1M rm/2=M(M+1)/4, and V(R′)=
∑m=1M rm2 /4=M(M+1)(2M+1)/24. Hence, when M is large, the
normally approximated p-value for R is
P N 0;1ð Þ≥ R−M M + 1ð Þ= 4
M M + 1ð Þ 2M + 1ð Þ=24f g1=2
 
:
Under the assumption of homogeneous treatment effects, the CI for
the effect can be obtained by inverting the signed-rank test procedure.
Conduct level-α tests with different values of β using
Rβ−M M + 1ð Þ = 4
M M + 1ð Þ 2M + 1ð Þ=24f g1=2 ; where Rβ≡ ∑
M
m=1
rmβ1 sm ym1−smβ−ym2ð Þ N 0½ 
ð7Þ
and rmβ is the rank of |ym1−smβ−ym2|,m=1,…,M. The collection ofβ
values that are not rejected is the (1−α)100% CI for β. To obtain a
point estimate of the treatment effect, we can use the Hodges and
Lehmann (1963) estimator, which is the solution of β such that
Rβ =
M M + 1ð Þ
4
= E R′
  
: ð8Þ
Note that when treatment effects are heterogeneous, the pair-wise
effect βm (instead of β) should be subtracted from each pair-wise
difference in (7), but in Rβwe cannot pull out the pair-wise effects βm,
m=1, 2, …, M, and summarize them by a single number as in Dβ.
Thus, one cannot generalize (7) and (8) to the case of heterogeneous
treatment effects.
Appendix C. Sensitivity analysis
Given pþ≡ Γ1 + Γ ≥ 0:5 and p−≡ 11 + Γ ≤ 0:5, deﬁne R
+ (R−) as the
sumofM-many independent randomvariableswhere themth variable
takes the value rmwith probability p+ (p−) and 0with probability 1−
p+ (1−p−). Writing R+ as∑m=1M rmum, where P(um=1)=p+ and
P(um=0)=1−p+, we get
E Rþ
 
= ∑
M
m=1
rmE umð Þ = pþ ∑
M
m=1
rm =
pþM M + 1ð Þ
2
;
VðRþÞ = ∑
M
m=1
r2mV umð Þ = pþð1−pþÞ ∑
M
m=1
r2m
=
pþ 1−pþ
 
M M + 1ð Þ 2M + 1ð Þ
6
:
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Analogously, writing R− as ∑m=1M rmum, where P(um=1)=p−
and P(um=0)=1−p−, we obtain
E R−ð Þ = p
−M M + 1ð Þ
2
and V R−ð Þ = p
− 1−p−ð ÞM M + 1ð Þ 2M + 1ð Þ
6
:
It follows from Rosenbaum (2002, Proposition 13) that P(R+≥
a)≥P(R′≥a)≥P(R−≥a) for arbitrary a.
For treatment effect analysis with matching, various sensitivity
analyses have appeared in the statistics literature as reviewed in
Rosenbaum (2002), but not many in econometrics. Those that have
appeared in the econometrics literature include the parametric/
structural regression approach of Imbens (2003) and Altonji et al.
(2005). This approach allows for an unobserved confounder to affect
both treatment and response, but is heavily dependent on the
parametric assumptions about the structural equations of treatment
and response.
Ichino et al. (2008) suggested an alternative, simulation-based,
approachof sensitivity analysis formatching estimators. This approach
also allows for an unobserved confounder to affect both treatment and
response, but without relying on any parametric/structural model for
the treatment and response. The unobserved confounder is simulated
and included in the list of matching covariates to evaluate the sen-
sitivity of point effect estimates. This is feasible only for binary
unobserved confounders in the context of binary treatment/response
variables, so that the distribution of the unobserved confounder can be
characterized by four probability parameters conditional on the
treatment/response outcomes.
Gastwirth et al. (1998) extended the Rosenbaum (2002) approach
by allowing the unobserved confounder to affect both treatment
and response. The approach of Gastwirth et al. (1998) is, however,
parametric/structural; it speciﬁes exactly how the unobserved con-
founder appears in the treatment and response equations. For instance,
in the casewhere both the treatment and response variables are binary,
the logit form is obtained, whichmay not look so objectionable; in other
cases, the parametric speciﬁcation becomes too restrictive. In a sense,
the beneﬁt of considering how the unobserved confounder affects the
response is obtained at this parametrization cost. Refer to Lee et al.
(2007) and Lee and Lee (2009) for applications of this approach. Since a
hidden bias results from unobserved confounders affecting both
treatment and response, the Rosenbaum (2002) analysis is conservative
in the sense that it may be concerned with a hidden bias that does not
exist at all if the unobserved confounder does not affect the response.
Thus, if we ﬁnd a result to be robust using the Rosenbaum (2002)
approach, its robustness using the Gastwirth et al. (1998) approach is
implied. Refer also to Lee (2004) for a nonparametric reduced-form
sensitivity analysis.
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